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More than half of all Americans live in areas that violate at least one of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agencys air quality standards for ground-level ozone and fine 
particulate matter.  The majority of these areas have many options to come into 
compliance with the standards, such as requiring vehicle inspection/maintenance 
programs, changing gasoline blends, and requiring additional controls on power plants.  
Chapter 1 explores the use of conjoint-based choice experiments to assist local 
policymakers in determining the most beneficial policy strategy using the case study of 
Knoxville, Tennessee.  Given that different policy actions pass costs onto households in 
different ways and that households may have varying preferences regarding how they pay 
those costs, I test whether willingness to pay for air quality improvements is sensitive to 
the method of payment.  Potential heterogeneity of preferences is modeled through a 
mixed logit specification.  Results indicate positive willingness to pay among Knoxville 
area residents for improvements in air quality, with vehicle inspection and an increase in 
the price of gasoline as the preferred payment vehicles over an increase in the electricity 
bill. 
Chapter 2 investigates the underlying incentive compatibility of choice 
experiments with tests of the mechanism in an induced value laboratory setting.  The 
theoretical properties of both dichotomous choice and trichotomous choice elicitation 
formats are explored under plurality voting rules and more generally under the 
assumption that the respondent perceives her decision to have some influence on the 
outcome.  Results indicate that certain belief structures can lead to incentive compatible 
v 
outcomes in a trichotomous choice format, depending on how a respondent believes the 
agency will incorporate respondent decisions into the provision of a public good.  In 
addition, the trichotomous choice treatments had fewer deviations from theory and were 
less subject to status quo bias than treatments with dichotomous choice questions.  
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CHAPTER 1:  VALUING AIR QUALITY POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE 
KNOXVILLE METROPOLITAN AREA 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
More than half of all Americans live in areas where air pollution violates the 
standards put forth by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1  The two most 
pervasive ambient air pollutants are ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter, which 
are linked to increased incidences of respiratory and cardiopulmonary disease.  While the 
federal government has taken some actions that will mitigate pollution problems 
nationwide, local policymakers in areas characterized by higher levels of pollution must 
also take incremental actions to ensure compliance with federal laws governing air 
quality.  
In many areas of the country, policymakers have a great degree of flexibility in 
choosing emission reduction measures.  In areas where several options to meet air quality 
standards are available, a decision must be made as to which measure, or combination of 
measures, would achieve air quality standards.  A mechanism particularly suited to 
informing the policy choice from the menu of options is the stated-choice method of 
choice experiments (CE).  Based on conjoint analysis, this method has been used to value 
environmental amenities since the 1990s, but has been used extensively in the marketing 
and transportation literature to derive relative values of a goods constituent attributes 
(hence the name conjoint, for considered jointly).   
                                                
1 U.S. EPA Greenbook of Nonattainment Areas 
2 
The conjoint approach was used to estimate the willingness to pay of households 
in the Knoxville, Tennessee area for improved air quality.  Surveys were collected from 
over 400 individuals representing households in this area to provide the data needed to 
generate estimates of willingness to pay for air quality improvements.  Due to a 
combination of topographic conditions, proximity to coal-fired power plants, an increase 
in population and vehicle miles traveled, and the convergence of major trucking routes (I-
75, I-40, and I-81), the Knoxville area2 was found to be in violation with both the ozone 
and fine particulate matter standards in 2004.  
The results of this study demonstrate how choice experiments can assess potential 
welfare impacts to households from various policy options to reduce both ozone and fine 
particulate matter emissions and, thus, inform the policy debate.  Because the Knoxville 
area is considered by the EPA to be a basic nonattainment area, it has more flexibility in 
determining which actions to undertake to meet EPA standards.3  Myriad combinations of 
policy actions can be utilized to meet the air quality standards, each having differing 
impacts on households in terms of cost, method of payment, and effect on health and 
visibility of scenic views.  An important input to the policy process is an increased 
understanding of the value households place on different policy attributes and the welfare 
change associated with a particular policy strategy.  Candidate models for analyzing the 
survey data include multinomial logit, nested logit, and mixed logit.  The preferred model 
                                                
2 The Knoxville area designated nonattainment for ozone consists of counties belonging to its MSA 
(Anderson, Blount, Knox, Loudon, and Sevier), as well as neighboring Jefferson County and Cocke County 
(partial).  Anderson, Blount, Knox, Loudon, and Roane (partial) counties were designated nonattainment 
for particulate matter.  
3 Basic nonattainment areas are those areas that are in violation of the 8-hour ozone standard but are in 
attainment with the previous 1-hour ozone standard of 0.12 ppm.  Fewer prescriptive actions are required of 
these areas than those areas with more severe pollution problems. 
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is mixed logit, which provides a greater degree of behavioral realism for discrete choice 
data with its flexibility in modeling substitution patterns across alternatives and its ability 
to account for multiple choice situations for each respondent.4  The survey design and 
analysis also permit consideration of an important methodological question  does the 
method of payment for air quality benefits affect willingness to pay?   
The analysis indicates that households would be willing to pay for visibility and 
health improvements, with magnitudes depending on the method of payment (i.e., 
whether it is through a mandatory inspection and maintenance program for vehicles, an 
increase in the monthly electricity bill, or an increase in the price of gasoline). 
 
1.2  Air Quality Policy 
 
Under the Clean Air Act, states must achieve attainment of National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants  sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen 
oxide (NO), lead (PB), carbon monoxide (CO), coarse and fine particulate matter (PM10 
and PM2.5), and ground-level ozone (O3).  The EPA sets primary standards to protect 
public health and secondary standards to protect public welfare, which includes 
impairment of scenic views and damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings.  To 
assess compliance, the EPA requires states to monitor emissions and compares reported 
emissions with the pollutants allowable concentration.  If an area fails to meet pollutant 
standards, the state must develop within three years a separate State Implementation Plan 
                                                
4 The assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives implicit in the multinomial logit model was 
violated in this application. 
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(SIP) for each pollutant detailing how the state intends to come into attainment.  An area 
that is deemed nonattainment with EPA standards potentially faces economic penalties 
in the form of costly emission controls, emission offsets from new polluting sources, 
conformity of the areas transportation plan to its SIP, and the potential loss of highway 
funds.  The degree of these economic penalties depends on the severity of 
nonattainment.5   
Standards for ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter were revised in 1997 
due to new scientific research indicating that previous standards were not sufficient to 
protect public health.6  Industry-led litigation delayed implementation of the new 
standards until the Supreme Court upheld EPAs authority in 2002.  Cleared of legal 
hurdles, the EPA made attainment designations for ozone and fine particulate matter in 
2004.  A total of 474 counties with 159 million people were found to be in nonattainment  
                                                
5 If the state fails to submit or implement a SIP, or the EPA deems the SIP inadequate, a sanctions clock 
is set to prompt the state to remedy its deficiencies.  If the SIP has not been corrected within 18 months, the 
EPA may impose offset requirements for new emission sources and existing sources undergoing 
modification that mandate up to 2:1 emission reductions.  If the state has still not submitted an adequate 
SIP within six months of the offset requirements, federal highway funds could be revoked unless the funds 
are used for projects that improve air quality or safety.  An area could also lose its highway funds if 
metropolitan planning officials create a Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP) that does not conform to 
the air quality State Implementation Plan.  Finally, if an area continues to fail to meet its SIP obligations, 
the EPA can create its own implementation plan for the area, called a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP).   
6 In July 1997, EPA promulgated the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Fine Particles (PM2.5) 
and for Ground-level Ozone (O3) (USEPA, 1997a and 1997b).  The revised particulate matter standards 
added a standard for fine particles (PM2.5) and strengthened the standard for coarse particles (PM10).  The 
annual fine particle standard is a level of 15 micrograms per cubic meter, based on the 3-year average of 
annual mean PM2.5 concentrations.  The 24-hour fine particle standard is a level of 65 micrograms per cubic 
meter, based on the 3-year average of the 98th percentile of 24-hour concentrations.  The annual coarse 
particle standard is a level of 50 micrograms per cubic meter, based on the 3-year average of annual mean 
PM10 concentrations.  The 24-hour coarse particle standard is a level of 150 micrograms per cubic meter, 
not to be exceeded more than once per year.  The 8-hour ozone standard is a level of 0.08 parts per million 
(ppm), based on the 3-year average of the 4th highest concentration averaged over an 8-hour period.  The 
previous ozone standard was 0.125 ppm averaged over one hour, based on the 4th highest concentration 





with ozone, and 224 counties with 95 million people were found to be in nonattainment 
with particulate matter (see Figure 1.1). 
The EPA classifies ozone nonattainment areas by the degree of violation of the 
standard.  The classifications (basic, marginal, moderate, serious, severe and extreme) 
specify how much flexibility an area has in devising measures to attain the standard, as 
well as the length of time it is allowed to come into attainment.  Of areas in ozone 
nonattainment, 172 counties with approximately 43 million people are considered basic 
while an additional 80 counties with 21.5 million people live in areas that are considered 
marginal.  General requirements of basic and marginal areas include reasonably 
available control technologies (RACT) applied to existing sources emitting more than 
100 tons per year of ozone precursors and reasonable further progress towards 
attainment, all to be detailed in the SIP.  Other requirements to ensure that sources do not 
worsen air quality or interfere with meeting air quality standards include transportation 
conformity, new source review permitting procedures, and emission offsets.  These areas 
also have a relatively short time span to reach attainment (generally two years upon 
submission of the SIP).  Areas in more severe violation of the ozone standard may have 
specific measures prescribed for them by the EPA such as a vehicle inspection and 
maintenance program, reformulated gasoline, stricter emission offsets, vapor controls at 
gasoline stations, and more emission sources subject to RACT (USEPA, 1997b).  The 
proposed implementation rule for fine particulate matter indicates that the EPA would 
prefer not to have a classification system for this pollutant, but rather allow areas 
flexibility to meet the standard in a similar fashion as to what is required for basic and 





Figure 1.1: Nonattainment Counties  




1.2.1  Health Effects of Ground-level Ozone and Fine Particulate Matter 
Ground-level ozone is formed when nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) react in the presence of sunlight, with higher levels typically 
occurring between May and October.  Nitrogen oxides are emitted from motor vehicles, 
power plants, industrial boilers, cement kilns and other sources of combustion (e.g., 
construction, aircraft, farming, and recreation equipment), and can be transported 
hundreds of miles by prevailing winds.  Volatile organic compounds such as 
hydrocarbons occur naturally and are also emitted from motor vehicles, chemical plants, 
refineries, factories, consumer and commercial products, and industrial sources.  Ozone 
acts as a respiratory irritant, with short-term exposure leading to wheezing and coughing, 
shortness of breath, and chest pain (USEPA, 1999).  Long-term exposure has been linked 
with reduced lung function, inflammation of the lung lining and increased respiratory 
discomfort (Kunzli et al, 1997).  Populations most susceptible to the effects of ozone are 
children, the elderly, those who have compromised immune systems, and those who 
spend a lot of time working or exercising outdoors (Desqueyroux et al, 2002; Hoppe et al, 
2003; Deflino et al, 1998, Kinney and Lippmann, 2000; Peters et al, 1999; Thurston et al, 
1997).   
Fine particles less than 2.5 microns in diameter (PM2.5) result from fuel 
combustion from motor vehicles, power generation, and industrial facilities, as well as 
from residential fireplaces and wood stoves.  Coarse particles (PM10) are generally 
emitted from vehicles traveling on unpaved roads, materials handling, crushing and 
grinding operations, and windblown dust.  Particles can be emitted directly or can be 
secondarily formed by atmospheric processes that chemically transform gases to sulfates 
8 
and nitrates.  Haze-producing sulfate particles, formed by the chemical reaction of sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) in the atmosphere, account for 50 to 70 percent of the visibility reduction 
in the eastern part of the United States (USEPA, 2007).  Major sources of particulate 
matter include SO2 emissions from power plants and diesel exhaust.  Exposure to coarse 
particles is primarily associated with the aggravation of respiratory conditions, such as 
asthma (USEPA, 2000).  Fine particles are most closely associated with such health 
effects as increased hospital admissions and emergency room visits for heart and lung 
disease, increased respiratory symptoms and disease, decreased lung function, and 
premature death (Krewski et al, 2000; Pope et al, 2002).  As with ozone pollution, 
prevailing winds can transport fine particle pollution hundreds of miles (coarse particles 
tend to fall relatively close to the emission source).  Populations at risk include the 
elderly, individuals with pre-existing conditions such as cardiopulmonary disease, and 
children (USEPA, 1997a).   
 
1.2.2  Case Study: Knoxville, Tennessee  
As noted above, a convergence of factors contributes to Knoxvilles violation of 
air quality standards.  The three primary culprits are proximity to coal-fired power plants 
operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority, three heavily used interstate highways 
passing through the area (I-40, I-75 and I-81), and the bowl-shaped topography of the 
area that concentrates and traps air pollutants.  Knoxville is surrounded by the 
Cumberland Plateau and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park (GSMNP), which 
was named the most polluted national park in 2002 (National Parks Conservation 
Association, 2004).  According to the National Park Service, annual average visibility at 
9 
GSMNP is 25 miles, compared to natural conditions of 93 miles.  During severe haze 
episodes, visibility has been reduced to less than one mile (National Parks Service, 2001).   
Knox County was first deemed nonattainment for ground-level ozone following 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.7  Arguing that no violations of the standard 
occurred between 1989 and 1991, Knox County successfully petitioned the EPA to re-
designate it in attainment with air quality standards, and became a maintenance area in 
1991.8  Upon notification that the entire metropolitan area plus neighboring Jefferson 
County was in danger of violating the new 8-hour ozone standard in 2002, the Knoxville 
area voluntarily agreed to sign an Early Action Compact (EAC) with the EPA to reduce 
emissions earlier than would be required after nonattainment designations were made in 
2004.  The EPA offered these compacts to areas that were in attainment with the old one-
hour ozone standard, but were projected to violate the new, stricter 8-hour standard.  In 
return for earlier emission reductions, the area could avoid nonattainment status and its 
attendant penalties.  Local officials submitted the required Air Quality Improvement Plan 
to the EPA in March 2004, which proposed such emission reduction actions as a lower 
speed limit on rural interstates, truck stop electrification, cetane additives to diesel fuel, 
and a ban on open burning.  Of about 30 EAC submissions nationwide, the EPA only 
rejected three areas as insufficient: Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Memphis (all Tennessee 
                                                
7 The ozone standard in 1990 was 0.120 ppm, averaged over one-hour, with violations occurring if the 4th 
highest concentration over the previous three year period exceeded this value. 
8 Requirements of maintenance areas include a prevention of significant deterioration permitting program 
and contingency measures to ensure compliance with the ozone standard for at least ten years following re-
designation to attainment.  Elements of Knox Countys maintenance plan included modeling emissions 
growth, requiring fuel with reid vapor pressure of 9.0 pounds per square inch, and installing RACT on 
major sources of emissions.  
10 
areas), subjecting them to full nonattainment status.9   
The Knoxville area officially became a nonattainment area for ozone and fine 
particulate matter in June 2004 and December 2004, respectively.  The area was given 
two years to create the state implementation plans detailing how it will achieve 
attainment, and is required to meet the ozone and fine particulate matter standards by 
2009 and 2010, respectively.  The choice experiment application to this area 
demonstrates how this method can benefit policymakers by estimating the relative public 





1.3.1  Valuing Nonmarket Goods 
Environmental economists attempt to estimate both use and non-use values for 
environmental goods and services that are not priced in the marketplace.  Use values arise 
from directly consuming the environmental good, such as rock-climbing in a national 
park or enjoying scenic views.  Non-use values do not stem from current use of the good, 
but are rather derived from having the option to use the good in the future (option 
value), to allow future generations to consume the good (bequest value), or to know 
that the environmental good exists (existence value).  An example of existence value is 
the utility that an individual derives from knowing that the Arctic National Wildlife 
                                                
9 Chattanooga subsequently revised its early action plan to include vehicle inspection/maintenance, and was 
allowed to remain an EAC. 
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Refuge is preserved, even if that individual never intends to visit the refuge personally.  
Stated preference methods are survey-based methods used to estimate willingness to pay 
for an environmental improvement, and can estimate both use and non-use values.  The 
most common type of stated preference method to value environmental amenities is 
contingent valuation (CV), where respondents are given information regarding a 
proposed improvement to the good and asked a question to gauge willingness to pay to 
realize this change.  Willingness to pay can be expressed by a variety of payment 
vehicles, such as an increase in income taxes, a one-time charge, a user tax, an increase in 
the price of a particular good, etc.  The payment elicitation mechanism can also vary.  
Initial applications of the method asked open-ended willingness to pay (e.g., How much 
would you be willing to pay to provide this hiking trail?), while more recent applications 
typically ask a dichotomous choice question (e.g., Would you be willing to pay $x to 
provide this hiking trail?  Please circle yes or no.)  The first contingent valuation study 
was conducted by Davis (1963) to estimate the value of big game hunting in Maine.  
After a study of the Four Corners region in 1974 by Randall, Ives, and Eastman, CV was 
recognized as providing a measure of Hicksian surplus arising from the provision of 
public goods.10   
Because stated preference methods utilize hypothetical markets where payment 
may not actually take place, the analyst must bear in mind several potential types of 
biases that could arise, and take the appropriate steps to correct for them.  Respondents, 
knowing that their answers could influence policy, may not provide their true willingness 
                                                
10 Use of the CV method for policy analysis was affirmed by Federal Court in State of Ohio v. U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 880 F. 2nd, 474.  
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to pay for a public good when payment is not required.  Other sorts of biases that may 
drive a wedge between actual and stated willingness to pay include interviewer bias (if 
the study is conducted face-to-face), yea-saying (the respondent feels compelled to 
provide the response he or she feels is correct), embedding/scope effects (the 
respondents willingness to pay is invariant to different quantities of the good), or 
hypothetical bias (knowing that the exercise is only a survey, the respondent may not take 
the task seriously).  Because the respondent is not actually observed making the payment 
in the marketplace to obtain the good, doubts have been cast regarding this methods 
validity in obtaining unbiased estimates of willingness to pay (Diamond and Hausman, 
1994).  Numerous refinements of the CV method have continued over the past 30 years to 
improve its reliability as a valid means of measuring welfare by improving survey design 
and implementation (Mitchell and Carson, 1989).  General conclusions are that 
respondents should be cognizant of the relevant attributes of the good, the proposed 
change in the good (including details of the status quo), what exactly they are asked to 
value, the acceptability of giving a no response, how the change in provision of the 
good will be achieved in a plausible manner, the degree of certainty regarding both the 
changed scenario and the status quo, and the distribution of the good (Hanemann, 1994).   
CV began to be used in the legal arena as the basis of natural resource damage 
claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) of 1980, and was most famously used to assess non-use damages arising 
from the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 (Ward and Duffield, 1992).  The National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) commissioned a blue ribbon panel to 
evaluate the credibility of using CV to estimate nonuse values in 1993, and provided 
13 
specific recommendations to improve its reliability such as the use of dichotomous choice 
as the elicitation mechanism (NOAA 1993).  The general consensus of the literature is 
that stated preference methods should not be considered unreliable simply because they 
are based on a hypothetical market, but that reliability is a function of survey design and 
implementation.  Furthermore, if one believes non-use values should be relevant to 
policymaking decisions, stated preference methods provide the only means of capturing 
them.  Further discussion of the incentive compatibility of stated preference methods will 
be presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
  
1.3.2  Choice Experiments 
In the 1990s environmental economists began exploring choice experiments as an 
alternative to contingent valuation in valuing environmental amenities.  Choice 
experiments are based on the assumption that individuals derive utility not from a good 
itself, but from its constituent attributes (Lancaster, 1966).  For example, an individual 
does not derive utility from a car per se, but from its color, fuel economy, seat material, 
power, design, price, etc.  The technique, developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982) and 
Louviere and Woodworth (1983), consists of presenting respondents with a choice set of 
options comprised of attributes with varying levels, and elicits the most preferred option 
from the choice set.  In this way choice experiments are similar to real world purchase 
decisions where consumers are presented with a variety of goods characterized by 
different attribute levels and choose whatever gives them the most satisfaction.  To 
identify relative attribute values several questions are asked per application.  This method 
has been used extensively in the marketing and transportation literature to derive the 
14 
relative values of a goods constituent attributes.  Environmental applications of this 
technique include the valuation of rivers (Morrison and Bennett, 2004), global warming 
mitigation options (Layton and Brown, 2000), remnant vegetation (Blamey et al, 2000), 
water supply options (Blamey et al, 1999), polluted beaches and rivers (Garrod and 
Willis, 1999), caribou habitat (Adamowicz et al, 1998), and freshwater recreation 
(Adamowicz et al, 1994).  Like contingent valuation, this method can estimate use as 
well as non-use values.   
Choice experiments are based on random utility theory (Luce, 1959 and 
McFadden, 1973), where the utility derived by individual n from option j, denoted njU  
below, is posited to have a deterministic component njV  that can be explained by the 
analyst and an unobservable, stochastic component, nje :  
njnjnj eVU +=  
Unlike conventional demand theory, an assumption must be made about the 
distribution of the error term e  in order to make predictions from the theory (Bateman et 
al, 2002).  According to random utility theory, an individual, when faced with alternative 
options, will choose that option that gives the highest level of utility.  The error term 
captures the analysts uncertainty about an individuals utility function.  
The probability that option j will be selected by individual n  from his available 
choice set can be modeled as the probability that the difference between the systematic 
components of utility between choice j and any alternative l  in the choice set is greater 
than the difference between the random components: 
)]()Pr[()]()Pr[( nlnjnlnjnlnlnjnj eeVVeVeV −>−=+>+ .  A common practice has been to 
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assume that the errors are independently and identically distributed (iid) extreme value.  
This assumption results in the conditional logit specification that requires the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  The IIA property implies that the addition 
or change of an alternative does not change the relative probability of selection between 
any other alternatives.  Substitution between alternatives is subsequently restricted to 
proportionate shifting, which is often not consistent with expectations.11  If IIA does not 
hold, parameter estimates are biased.  Methods to address IIA include adding 
socioeconomic and attitudinal variables to the model (Bennett et al, 2001a) or by 
analyzing choice data with the more general nested logit and mixed logit models.  
In a typical choice experiment application, the analyst creates choice sets of 
options that differ by the levels of their constituent attributes.  For example, if each 
choice set consisted of three options where each option i is described by a vector of 
attributes iX , the explained portion of utility for each option could be modeled as:  
Option 1: 111 ' XASCV β+=  
Option 2: 222 ' XASCV β+=  
Option 3 (baseline): 33 ' XV β=  
ASC1 and ASC2 are alternative specific constants for the options other than the constant 
baseline (Option 3), and serve to capture systematic but unobserved information 
                                                
11 Consider the classic red bus, blue bus example:  Suppose an individual can either drive a car to work or 
take a red bus, and derives equal utility from either option so that the probability of either transportation 
mode is ½.  Now assume that a blue bus service is offered, which is exactly the same as the red bus except 
for its color.  The probability that the individual will take the red bus will therefore be the same as taking 
the blue bus.  Because the multinomial logit model requires that the relative probability between driving a 
car and taking the red bus remain the same, the model predicts that the probability of each mode becomes 
1/3.  However, we would expect that the addition of the blue bus would not affect the probability of taking 
the car, and would simply split the probability of taking the red bus: prob(car) = ½ and prob (red bus) = 
prob (blue bus) = ¼. 
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regarding the choice of a particular option.  Whether the alternative specific constants 
should be estimated separately for each option is an empirical question.  Bennett et al 
(2001a) suggest that if the options are labeled across the choice sets (for example, by the 
overall policy effect of the bundle of attributes), ASC1 and ASC2 should be estimated 
separately.  If, on the other hand, options are generic and do not signal any information 
about the alternative (e.g., simply labeled Option 1 and Option 2), then the ASCs 
could be constrained to be equal.  Socioeconomic and attitudinal variables can also be 
included in these equations, but only as interactions with either the ASCs or the attributes 
since they do not vary across options in a choice set.  An advantage of choice 
experiments is the degree of experimental control held by the analyst in determining the 
range of attribute levels, which may or may not be currently experienced.   
Marginal rates of substitution can be calculated for any two attributes by dividing 





−= .  If kβ  is the coefficient of the payment 
variable, this calculation provides an estimate of the marginal willingness to pay for the 
attribute.12 
If one option is held constant over all choice sets, welfare measures can be 
calculated from the baseline (typically the status quo) to any state that can be created 
from the range of levels employed in the model.  Consequently, CE allows ranking of 
different alternatives, which assists policymakers by providing estimates of public 
support over competing options.  The typical welfare measure calculated from a choice 
experiment application is compensating surplus, which defines how much money must be 
                                                
12 In the discrete choice literature marginal willingness to pay is also referred to as the implicit price of an 
attribute.   
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taken away from an individual after receiving an environmental improvement to make 
him as well off as before the change in environmental quality.  Compensating surplus is 
therefore a measure of total willingness to pay for improvements in environmental quality 
(e.g., an increase in the visibility of scenic vistas).  Hanemann (1984) calculated 








































where 0V represents utility associated before the change in option(s) j, 1V  represents 
utility associated after the change in attribute levels, and paymentβ  is the coefficient of the 
payment variable.  0J and 1J  represent the number of options before and after the 
change, respectively.  If welfare is being calculated from one state of the world to 





− 10  
The negative of the payment coefficient represents the marginal utility of income since it 
provides how much utility is increased when the cost of an option decreases by one 
dollar.  In order to apply this formula for willingness to pay, marginal utility of income 
must be held constant.  While this is clearly an unrealistic assumption for all income 
levels, it may be reasonable over the range of policy outcomes. 
Relatively few studies have been conducted to test if choice experiments can 
result in respondents revealing their true preferences.  Concern has been raised over the 
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validity of this method because it does not contain an explicit provision rule (nor is one 
easily inferred) that maps how respondent choices will influence the policy outcome 
(e.g., a majority-rule referendum) and requires respondents to answer multiple questions 
where they choose one option from three or more alternatives.  It is well known that any 
mechanism other than a binary response cannot be incentive compatible without 
restricting agent preferences (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975).  Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation examines different preference structures under which the method can provide 
incentive compatible outcomes. 
Most studies examining the incentive properties of choice experiments look for 
evidence of hypothetical bias where perceived response incentives may deviate from 
those in an analogous situation with direct financial implications.13  Carlsson and 
Martinsson (2001) test for hypothetical bias using donations for environmental projects, 
and find no differences between actual and hypothetical marginal willingness to pay.  
Lusk and Schroeder (2004) find that hypothetical choices overestimate total willingness 
to pay for a private good, beef steaks, but that marginal willingness to pay for a change in 
steak quality is generally not significantly different across hypothetical and actual 
settings.  Carlsson et al (2006) find that the estimated marginal willingness to pay for 
food is significantly lower when a cheap talk script is used in the survey instrument.14  
List et al (2006) find no evidence of hypothetical bias (with or without cheap talk) in a 
study estimating the marginal willingness to pay for attributes of a private good (Nolan 
                                                
13 A concern here is whether the hypothetical instrument used in these tests satisfies Carson, Groves, and 
Machinas (2000) requirement of consequentiality for a survey to be incentive compatible.  This issue is 
addressed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. 
14 Cheap talk refers to providing survey recipients with information regarding the tendency of overstating 
willingness to pay in a survey format.  This script is provided before respondents are asked their 
willingness to pay. 
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Ryan baseball cards).  In addition, they find that responses elicited for the provision of a 
public good (contributions to the University of Central Floridas Center for 
Environmental Policy Analysis) were not significantly different between real and 
hypothetical cheap talk treatments, although subjects were more likely to donate if the 
treatment were hypothetical without cheap talk.   
Two studies of choice experiments have been conducted in a classroom setting.  
Boyle et al (2006) seek to explain the discrepancy of value estimates between choice 
experiments15 and contingent valuation by examining various provision rules.  They 
describe three provision rule treatments: an individual provision rule that implements for 
a specific individual the option that he chose, a group provision rule that implements the 
option receiving the most support regardless if it was chosen by a particular subject, and 
no provision rule that is intended to mimic field applications of choice experiments.  
Their results suggest that the inclusion of the individual provision rule significantly 
reduces the number of subjects who opt-in to the market for a private good, T-shirts, 
relative to the group provision rule and no provision rule treatments.  In valuing a real-
world public good, a local non-profit organization called Trees Atlanta that plants trees in 
the Atlanta metro area, they find that the group provision rule and no provision rule 
treatments yield higher marginal values than either the real or hypothetical individual 
provision rule treatments.  The only test of the incentive compatibility of choice 
experiments using induced values in a lab setting is concurrent research by Carson et al 
(2006).  They test if the rate of non-demand revealing responses significantly differs 
                                                
15 In their paper, as elsewhere in the discrete choice literature, choice experiments is referred to as choice 
modeling.  Choice experiments have also been referred to as conjoint-based choice experiments. 
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across elicitation formats that vary by the number of options (dichotomous choice vs. 
multiple choice) and the number of choice sets (single vs. repeated).  They find that while 
the frequency of violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the multiple 
choice treatments are not significant, the rate of non-demand revelation in the repeated 
multiple choice treatment is significantly higher than in the repeated dichotomous choice 
treatment. 
 
1.4  Application 
 
1.4.1  Description of Policy Attributes   
A survey was designed to elicit household preferences over different policy 
options to meet regional air quality standards.  Because the survey was designed to be 
administered to households, the attributes of different policy options (the benefits and 
costs) were those determined most salient to this population.  Benefits include both the 
increase in average visibility and the number of healthy days per year (healthy days are 
defined as days the area is not violating any air quality standard).  Potential costs of 
achieving air quality improvements include increases in the costs of gasoline, electricity, 
and the costs of complying with a vehicle inspection/maintenance program.  To be 
consistent with welfare theory, attribute levels are defined as changes relative to the 
status quo.  In this application (as in Blamey et al, 2000), the status quo consists of the 
level of benefits if no additional local action is taken.  While households would incur no 
direct costs under the status quo, the area would remain in violation of EPA standards and 
be subject to costly industry and transportation controls.  Due to actions already taken at 
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the federal level regarding power plant emissions and a combination of engine and fuel 
standards, some improvement in visibility and the number of healthy days will already 
occur without local action (although not sufficient to bring the area into attainment).   
In addition to determining relative values for environmental and health attributes, 
this study also considers the impact of differing payment vehicles.  Typically choice 
experiments only employ one payment attribute (usually an unspecified, general tax to 
the respondent), but a more comprehensive treatment of this variable seems warranted for 
policy analysis as different policy alternatives equate to different methods of payment.  A 
key component of this research will be to test whether elicited willingness to pay is 
sensitive to the method of payment. 
Attribute levels encompass the potential range of policy actions (see Table 1.1).  
According to the EPAs AirData database, the Knoxville area averaged 40 unhealthy air 
quality days per year from 1999-2003.16  Levels of this attribute are specified as 
improvements from this baseline (e.g., an increase of 32 healthy days).  Similarly, 
average annual visibility levels are expressed as improvements over the current baseline 
of 25 miles (e.g., an increase in visibility of 7 miles).  On the cost side, an 
inspection/maintenance program is described as requiring households to spend $20 per 
year to test each vehicle, with an average repair cost of $150 for a failing vehicle 
(Cummins, 2004).  The levels derived for the choice sets included the testing fee of $20 
and the repair cost averaged over the expected lifetime of the vehicle (assumed to be 5 
years).  According to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) officials, electricity rates could  
                                                
16 Accessed at http://www.epa.gov/air/data/, updated September 26, 2006. 
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Table 1.1  Policy Attributes and Levels 
Attribute Levels 
Visibility improvement 1 mile 
 7 miles 
 15 miles 
  
Healthy days improvement 16 days 
 24 days 
 32 days 
  
Increase in cost of gasoline per gallon 0 cents 
 4 cents 
 8 cents 
  








increase up to 14% if TVA were required to spend at least $1 billion on additional 
emissions controls such as scrubbers (Powelson, 2004).  Because the average monthly 
electricity bill for the area is approximately $85, the upper level for this attribute is an 
increase of $144 per year.  Several potential control measures could affect the price of 
gasoline, such as requiring vapor recovery nozzles to capture evaporative emissions of 
VOCs or mandating the use of reformulated and/or lower volatility gasoline.  Vapor 
controls and lower volatility gasoline would each cost approximately 2 cents extra per 
gallon (USEPA, 1991; Energy Information Administration, 1999), while reformulated 
gasoline would cost 5  8 cents extra per gallon (USEPA, 1999b).  Because of the lack of 
knowledge regarding the respondents expenditure on gasoline per year, the cost of 
gasoline was expressed as the increase in cents per gallon in the choice set.  Examples 
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were given in the survey to translate the price increase per gallon into yearly costs to the 
household by calculating the cost of a small car averaging 22 miles per gallon and driven 
12,000 miles per year and the cost of driving a large car averaging 12 miles per gallon 
and driven 12,000 miles per year.  
 
1.4.2  Experimental Design 
The series of choice sets were created by using a fractional factorial design, where 
levels of attributes were varied in a systematic way to efficiently estimate the parameters 
of the model with the fewest choice sets per respondent.  With five attributes having three 
levels each, and for each choice set that contains two varying policy bundles and one 
bundle fixed at status quo levels, the total factorial design that gives all possible 
combinations of alternatives results in 35*2 = 59,049 combinations.  Obviously 
respondents cannot be expected to face that many choice alternatives, so a fractional 
factorial design must be used that finds the smallest number of combinations that still 
enables statistical identification of the attributes.  While fractional factorial designs can 
estimate the direct independent effects (also known as main effects) of the attributes on 
choice selection, they cannot estimate the impact of attribute interactions.  For example, 
preferences for the number of healthy days per year must be assumed to be independent 
of the level of visibility.  This tradeoff is acceptable considering that main effects account 
for between 70 and 90 percent of explained variance (Louviere, 2000).   
A fractional factorial of 18 choice sets was created using the D-efficiency 
criterion in SAS that minimizes the variance matrix of the nonlinear choice model 
(Kuhfeld, 2003).  The SAS procedure selects alternatives from the full factorial and 
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compares efficiency across 100 different experimental designs.  Maximizing D-efficiency 
results in a design with the smallest possible errors around the estimated parameters.  The 
SAS code is presented in Appendix A.  To further reduce the cognitive burden to 
respondents, this design was blocked into three survey versions of six choice sets.  The 
resulting combinations of attribute levels were constrained to represent plausible 
scenarios to respondents.  For example, visibility could not improve from the status quo 
level if there were no increases in the monthly electricity bill since visibility 
improvement is primarily a function of power plant emissions of sulfur dioxide.  
Dominated alternatives were also discarded. 
 
1.4.3  Survey Design and Sample 
Surveys were designed following suggestions from the Dillman Total Design 
Method (Dillman, 2000).  For example, the survey cover design consisted of a map of the 
relevant sample area, cover letters to the respondent were personalized and individually 
signed, regular postage stamps were used on all envelopes, reminder post-cards were 
mailed a week after the survey.  An incentive to respond was provided by including an 
optional raffle form to win one of ten $50 gift cards to Wal-Mart from a random drawing.  
Respondents were informed that survey results would be considered as an input into the 
policymaking process and that their individual responses would remain confidential.  
Background information on current air quality in the Knoxville area was provided, as 
well as an example of a choice set, presented below in Figure 1.2.  Choice sets 
constructed from the experimental design were then presented for the respondents to 
select preferred options, followed by questions on socioeconomic status and attitudes  
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Sample Question: Suppose the following three policies were the only options 
available for achieving air quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Please indicate 
which policy you prefer by checking one of the boxes below. 
 
 
Policy Benefits and Costs 
Local Policy A Local Policy B Policy C: 
No Local Action 
Visibility improvement 1 mile 7 miles 1 mile 
Healthy days improvement 32 days 16 days 16 days 
Gasoline price increase per gallon 0 cents 8 cents 0 cents 
Vehicle inspection cost per year $50 $20 $0 
Increase in electric bill per year $144 $72 $0 
 
I would choose: Policy A Policy B Policy C
 
 
If you choose Policy A, you are indicating that you would prefer the policy with these 
outcomes: 
 
• Visibility improvement: 1 mile. Under this policy option, average annual 
visibility would improve from 25 miles to 26 miles. 
• Healthy days improvement: 32. Under this policy option, the number of healthy 
days would improve by 32 days.  Instead of 40 unhealthy days per year, there 
would only be 8 unhealthy days per year on average. 
• Gasoline price increase per gallon: 0 cents. This policy option does not include 
changes to gasoline, so gasoline prices would be unchanged. 
• Vehicle inspection cost per year: $50.  Emissions testing is a part of this policy 
option. The cost represents the testing fee ($20) plus the average payment if a 
vehicle fails inspection, spread out over a five-year lifetime of the vehicle ($30). 
• Increase in electric bill per year: $144.  This policy option would require power 
plants to install additional equipment, and lead to electricity price increases of $12 
per month, or $144 per year. 
 
Policy B has a similar interpretation, while Policy C represents the No Local Action 
scenario where benefits occur because of actions already taken at the Federal level.  For 
this reason Policy C has no new costs to households, but the area may lose future 
business development as a result of violating air quality standards. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Example of Choice Set 
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toward the environment.  Socioeconomic variables included age, gender, income, 
education, vehicle ownership, and occurrence of asthma in family or friends.  Attitudinal 
variables included membership in an environmental organization, whether or not the 
respondent had read news articles about local air quality during the previous year, if the 
respondent believed the articles were accurate, etc.  An example of the survey is included 
in Appendix B. 
The survey was mailed to a random sample of households living in the Knoxville 
MSA and neighboring Jefferson County.17  Surveys were mailed to 2,400 households on 
April 15, 2004, the day that EPA declared the area would formally receive a 
nonattainment designation with respect to the ozone standard.  Two hundred additional 
surveys were mailed out in May to account for the high number of bad addresses in the 
earlier sample.  The overall response rate was approximately 18%, with 403 usable 
surveys collected (after accounting for bad addresses, a total of 2,289 surveys were 
actually delivered).  Table 1.2 provides summary statistics of respondents.  Compared 
with information gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census for the Knoxville MSA, the 
average respondent is older, more educated, and more likely to be male than the typical 
individual living in the area.18  Family income is fairly comparable, averaging $44,800 in 
the survey sample and $45,700 in the census.  With such a low response rate, the problem 
of sample selection must be investigated to determine if survey respondents have 
fundamentally different preferences for air quality programs than the underlying 
population.  This issue is addressed in Appendix C.   
                                                
17 The survey sample was obtained from Marc Publishing Company, which provides direct mailing and 
telemarketing services. 
18 According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the median age of the Knoxville MSA is 37.3, 76.5% of individuals 
have less than a bachelors degree, and 48.4% of the population is male. 
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Table 1.2  Summary Statistics 
Variable Sample mean 
(std. dev.) 
Selected Data for the 
Knoxville MSA  
Age 50.32 (17.16) 37.3 (median) 
Number of household members 2.55 (1.36) 2.38 
Number of children under age 6 0.25 (0.63)  
Number of household vehicles 2.48 (1.57) 2.0 
Read news articles on Knoxville air 
quality within past year (%) 
80.5 (39.6)  
Believed news articles on air quality 
to be accurate (%) 
84.0(36.6)  
White (%) 90.9 (28.7) 91.2 
Black (%) 5.1 (21.9) 5.8 
Hispanic (%) 1.5 (12.2) 1.3 
Asian (%) 1.8 (13.2) 0.9 
Visited Smoky Mountain National 
Park within last year (%) 
70.0 (45.8)  
Belong to an environmental 
organization (%) 
18.5 (38.8)  
Household income ($) 44,800 (30,041) 45,700 
Male (%) 55.3 (49.7) 48.4 
Republican Party affiliation (%) 51.8 (50.0)  
Democratic Party affiliation (%) 34.6 (47.6)  
Married (%) 56.0 (49.6) 57.5 
Household member with asthma (%) 24.8 (43.2)  
Know someone in the area with 
asthma (%) 
69.3 (46.1)  
Less than bachelors degree (%) 60.5 (48.9) 76.6 
Monthly electricity bill ($) 125.47 (63.18)  
Have lived in an area requiring 
vehicle inspection (%) 
38.2 (48.6)  
Miles driven per year 15,177.0 (12,314.0)  
Work fulltime (%) 53.1 (49.9)  
Retired (%) 29.5 (45.6)  
Student (%) 3.8 (19.1)  
Data for the Knoxville MSA obtained from the 2000 U.S. Census. 
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1.5.  Model Specifications  
 
1.5.1 Mixed Logit 
The data is analyzed using a series of mixed logit models.  The mixed logit model 
is a generalization to the conditional logit model that allows some parameters to be 
randomly distributed across households.  This assumption relaxes the notion that all 
individuals have the same preferences for a particular attribute, which is the case when a 
parameter is assumed to be constant across the sample.  McFadden and Train (2000) have 
shown that any discrete choice model based on random utility maximization can be 
represented by a mixed logit specification.    
Following Train (2003), utility for individual n  from alternative j can be 
described in the mixed logit model as: 
njnjnnjnjnj xVU εβε +




nβ  is a vector of individual-specific coefficients on observed policy- and individual-
specific variables, β represents the average preferences of the sample, and nβ
~ is the 
stochastic deviation of the respondents tastes relative to average tastes in the sample.  
Instead of being fixed over individuals, these coefficients vary over respondents with 
density )/( θβf  where θ  describes the underlying parameters of the distribution (i.e., 
mean and covariance).  njε  is a random term that is iid extreme value and independent of 
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nβ  and njx .  If preferences for a particular attribute are expected to be homogeneous 
across the sample, nβ
~  is simply assumed to be zero.   
The unconditional probability of individual n choosing alternative j from a choice 
set of K options is found by integrating the logit probability over the distribution of the 
random parameters:  


















Because this probability yields no closed form solution, choice probabilities are 
estimated by simulated maximum likelihood.  This procedure entails estimating the mean 
and covariance of ( )θβ /f , taking several draws of β  from this density, calculating the 
logit probability for each draw, and averaging over the number of draws.19  The simulated 

































where T is the number of draws.  The simulated probability approaches the population 














where dnj=1 if n chose j and dnj=0 otherwise.   
                                                
19 A quasi-random maximum simulated likelihood method known as Halton draws are generally used in the 
simulation.  Halton draws use non-random sequences to improve accuracy and reduce computation time.  
See Hensher and Greene (2003), Train (2003), and Train (1999) for the benefits of Halton number 
sequences vs. random numbers.   
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Since nβ
~ is common over each alternative for a given individual, the model 
accounts for the panel structure of the data where the same respondent answers several 
choice questions.20  This capability of the model is important since it is reasonable to 
believe that choices made by the same individual will be influenced by common 
unobservable factors.  The model also relaxes the assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives inherent in other logit models.  Because the probability of choosing 
a particular alternative involves the integration over the density of the parameters, the 
ratio of probabilities for any two alternatives will depend on the attributes of all 
alternatives in the choice set.  Consequently, more realistic substitution patterns can be 
generated in this model.  For example, by assuming that the two action alternatives share 
a common alternative specific constant, the model would predict that if one of the action 
alternatives were dropped the probability of choosing the remaining action option would 
rise proportionately more than the probability of choosing the status quo. 
To create a mixed logit model, the analyst specifies a distribution for the variables 
that are thought to vary across the sample, and also chooses which parameters should be 
correlated, if any.  Statistical significance of the estimated standard deviation of a random 
parameter indicates that unobserved heterogeneity is present in the sample.  Conversely, 
if the estimated standard deviation is insignificant, preferences for the attribute can be 
assumed to be homogeneous.  If the parameters distribution can span both positive and 
negative values, the proportion of the sample that obtains positive utility from the 
attribute can be calculated from the estimated mean and standard deviation.  When 
                                                
20 A sequence of choices by the same individual is taken into account by simply including the product of 
logit probabilities over an individuals choice sets in the likelihood function.  
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specifying a parameter distribution, consideration should be given to the prior expectation 
of a variables sign.  For example, if a variable should be non-negative (i.e., a benefit 
such as increase in the number of healthy days), the normal distribution may be 
inappropriate since some proportion of the distribution could be negative.   
The model for the Knoxville air quality application is defined over three options, 
with two alternatives consisting of local action to improve air quality, and the third option 
representing the status quo of no local action.  An alternative specific constant is defined 
to equal 1 for an alternative and 0 for the status quo.  The deterministic portion of 
utility for each option depends on the five policy attributes (visibility, healthy days, 
gasoline price, vehicle inspection/maintenance and electricity bill), as well as 
socioeconomic and attitudinal variables interacted with the alternative specific constant.  
The policy benefits and the alternative specific constant are allowed to vary across the 
sample.  The cost variables were chosen as nonstochastic in order to facilitate model 
convergence.   
Because healthy days and visibility are benefits that should have positive 
coefficients for all respondents, these variables are first specified with triangular 
distributions with the standard deviation constrained to equal the mean.  The density of 
the constrained triangular parameters starts at zero, rises linearly to the mean, and then 
declines to zero at twice the mean (Hensher, 2005).  A second specification that also 
constrains healthy days and visibility to be positive across the sample is to assume that 
they are log-normally distributed.  The primary difference between the two distributions 
is that the log-normal distribution has a very long upper tail, which if not representative 
of the sample could inflate the distribution of willingness to pay.  While the triangular 
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and log-normal models conform to expectations that the benefits provide positive utility 
across the sample, for comparison purposes a third model is also specified assuming that 
healthy days and visibility are normally distributed.  In all models, the alternative specific 
constant is specified as having a normal distribution since there is no a priori assumption 
regarding its sign.  The interactions of the alternative specific constant with 
socioeconomic terms are assumed to be constant.  The model is specified as follows: 
 
Alternative 1: 
=1nV  nαα ~+  + ( )n11 ~ββ +  * visibility + ( )n22 ~ββ + * healthy days + 3β *gas +   





=2nV  nαα ~+  + ( )n11 ~ββ +  * visibility + ( )n22 ~ββ + * healthy days + 3β *gas +   





=3nV  ( )n11 ~ββ +  * visibility + ( )n22 ~ββ + * healthy days + 3β *gas + 4β *inspection + 
5β *electric bill  
 
1.5.2 Estimation 
The three cost variables were converted to increases in household expenditures 
per year for consistency.  The electricity bill and vehicle inspection costs are 
straightforward: the increase in the electricity bill is already given in yearly expenditure 
per household in the survey, and the cost of vehicle inspection is calculated by simply 
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multiplying the per-car cost by the number of vehicles in the household (provided by the 
respondent in the survey).  The yearly household expenditures on gasoline are imputed by 
using the stated number of miles driven per year for the respondent and an estimate of the 
number of miles driven per year by the other driving-age members of the household (the 
survey elicited the number of household members older than sixteen).21  The number of 
gallons of gasoline per year is estimated by taking the imputed total household miles 
driven per year and divided by an estimate of average household fuel economy, which 
was derived by the stated number of passenger cars versus sport utility vehicles in the 




1.6.1 Analysis of Choice Probabilities 
Table 1.4 presents the estimation results for the mixed logit models.22  Model 1 
has triangularly distributed benefits, Model 2 has log-normally distributed benefits, and 
Model 3 has normally distributed benefits.   
                                                
21 The 2001 National Household Travel Survey, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Transportation, was 
used to estimate the number of miles driven per year for non-respondent household members based on age 
and Tennessee residency.  If the respondent was over 65, male, and married, then other members of the 
household older than sixteen were assumed to drive 4,000 miles per year.  If the respondent was over 65, 
female, and married, then other members of the household older than sixteen were assumed to drive 9,500 
miles per year.  If the respondent was younger than 65, male, and married, other driving-age household 
members were assumed to drive 10,000 miles per year.  If the respondent were younger than 65, female, 
and married, other driving-age household members were assumed to drive 20,000 miles per year.  
Household fuel economy was derived by assuming that vehicles meet the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) requirements: 27.5 mpg for passenger cars and 20.7 mpg for SUVs. 
22 For comparison, multinomial logit and nested logit models were also run on the data.  The procedure 
devised by Hausman and McFadden (1984) confirmed that the IIA assumption did not hold for the 
multinomial logit model when Local Policy A was dropped from the sample (Hausman test statistic = 
78.0).  A nested logit model was specified where local policy options were partitioned into an action nest 
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Table 1.3  Variables Used in Mixed Logit Models  
Variable  Definition 
   
Policy Specific   
Constant  Alternative specific constant =1 if Local Policy A or Local Policy B, else zero (status quo) 
Visibility  Visibility improvement in miles 
Healthy days  Number of healthy days improvement 
Gas  Yearly household increase in gas cost  
Inspection  Yearly household vehicle inspection cost  




Lbach  Less than bachelors degree*Constant 
Elbill  Monthly electricity bill*Constant  
 
                                                                                                                                            
and a status quo nest to relax the IIA assumption between nests.  However, the inclusive value coefficient 
for the action nest exceeded one, indicating that the nest structure did not improve upon the multinomial 
logit specification.  Even if the IIA assumption were not violated, the multinomial logit and nested logit 
models cannot account for unobserved preference heterogeneity or temporal correlation across choice 
questions answered by the same individual. 
35 
Table 1.4  Mixed Logit Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 





































































      
Model Statistics      
Log-Likelihood -1658.597 -1591.175 -1596.458 
Number of choice 
sets 
2058 2058 2058 
Likelihood ratio 
index 
0.264 0.294 0.292 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *,**, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from zero 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 1000 Halton draws were used for each 
model.23  Distribution of random parameters across models: Model 1: Constant (normal), 
Visibility (triangular), Healthy Days (triangular); Model 2: Constant (normal), Visibility (log-
normal), Healthy Days (log-normal); Model 3: Constant (normal), Visibility (normal), Healthy 
Days (normal). 
                                                
23 Sensitivity of coefficients to the number of Halton draws was tested using several different numbers of 
replications.  In general, coefficients began to converge by 500 draws for each model.   
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Results of the mixed logit specification with triangularly distributed parameters 
(Model 1) indicates that visibility and healthy days positively affect the probability of a 
particular alternative being chosen, and are significant at the 1% level.  As expected, the 
cost variables negatively affect the likelihood of an alternative being chosen, and are also 
significant at the 1% level.  Heterogeneity around the mean of the random parameters is 
taken into account by interacting the random attributes with socioeconomic variables. 
The only socioeconomic variables found to significantly affect the mean of at least one 
random parameter are education level less than bachelors degree and monthly 
electricity bill.  The coefficient on the interaction term between individuals with less 
than a bachelors degree and the constant is negative, suggesting that these individuals 
have a greater preference for the status quo relative to those with at least a college 
education.  Individuals with higher electricity bills are positively associated with the 
constant term in the full model, suggesting that those with higher monthly bills prefer an 
action alternative.  The significance of the standard deviations of the random parameters 
indicates that there is still significant heterogeneity in tastes regarding the improvement 
in healthy days and visibility, as well as in the constant term, even after including 
heterogeneity around the mean.  The likelihood ratio index, which measures the 
percentage improvement in the log-likelihood function of the specified model over a 
model with zero parameters, was approximately 0.26.24  Hensher and Johnson (1981) and 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) state that a likelihood ratio index between 0.2 and 0.4 
indicates the model provides a good fit for the data. 
                                                
24 This metric is also known as adjusted rho-squared. 
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The results of the log-normal specification (Model 2) parallel those of Model 1 in 
terms of signs and significance of the coefficients, except that the interaction of the 
constant and electricity bill no longer significantly affects the probability that an option 
will be chosen.25  The likelihood ratio index improves to 0.29, suggesting a slightly better 
fit of the data relative to the constrained triangular model. 
The model with normally distributed parameters (Model 3) closely resembles the 
triangular model in terms of significant variables, with the notable exception that healthy 
days no longer significantly determines the probability of choice.  The likelihood ratio 
index is approximately 0.29.  While this seems to indicate that specifying the random 
parameters with normal distributions fits the data better than with triangular distributions, 
a consequence of normal distributions is the possibility that a beneficial attribute might 
have negative values for some portion of the sample.  To determine the percentage of the 
sample that the model predicts will derive negative utility from the policy benefits, the 
estimated mean and standard deviation of the parameters are used to calculate the 
cumulative normal distribution evaluated at zero.  Following this procedure, the model 
predicts that 28.7% of the sample has a negative value for visibility and 43.8% has a 
negative value for healthy days.  Obviously this is not consistent with underlying 
preferences and is thus a drawback of using normally distributed parameters.    
 
                                                
25 The mean effect of a log-normally distributed coefficient β  with standard deviation s is obtained by 
)2/exp( s+β .    
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1.6.2 Testing the Equality of Payment Vehicles 
An objective of the study is to investigate whether the type of payment affects 
willingness to pay.  Wald tests were employed to test the equality of the three payment 
coefficients, with results presented in Table 1.5.26      
Using a series of pair-wise tests, all models strongly reject that the three payment 
coefficients are equal.  However, in the log-normal specification, the hypothesis that the 
gas price coefficient is equal to the electricity bill coefficient cannot be rejected.  These 
results suggest that the method of payment affects willingness to pay for improvements in 
air quality, and that households may be less averse to paying for policy benefits through 
vehicle inspection or gas prices than through an increase in their electricity bill.27  While 
we would expect respondents to be indifferent between paying $1 to improve air quality 
through gas prices and paying $1 through vehicle inspection, preferences may be affected 
by the payment label.   For instance, individuals may have a visceral negative response to 
any increase in the electricity bill and therefore believe that vehicle inspection is a more 
tolerable means of improving air quality.  Another possibility is that the discrepancy is 
due to survey framing since the choice sets in the survey presented the increase in the 
price of gasoline as cents per gallon, the increase in the electricity bill as dollars per year, 
and the requirement of a vehicle inspection and maintenance program as dollars per year  
                                                
26 The Wald statistic provides a test of model restrictions and has a limiting chi-squared distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. 
27 This finding is robust to alternative assumptions in the calculation of gas costs.  Specifically, models 
were run assuming that all other driving age members of the household drive 5,000, 15,000 and 25,000 
miles per year.  Wald tests rejected all hypotheses that payment coefficients were equal in these models, 
with the exception of the hypothesis that Gas = IM in the triangular and normal specifications when other 
drivers in the household were assumed to drive 15,000 per year (p=0.342 and p=0.058), and in the 
triangular, log-normal and normal specifications in the model assuming other drivers drive 5,000 miles per 
year (p=0.225, p=0.779 and p=0.660). 
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Table 1.5  Testing the Equality of Payment Vehicles 





















Entries in table are Wald test statistics with p-values in parentheses. 
 
per vehicle.  However, since increases in gas prices are typically stated in the media as 
additional cents per gallon, survey framing effects may be irrelevant for the ranking of 
policy options if policymakers are only interested in how the public perceives costs. 
Evidence that the method of payment affects willingness to pay has also been 
found in other stated preference studies.  In their meta-analysis of wetland values derived 
from contingent valuation applications, Brouwer, Langford, Bateman and Turner (1999) 
examined several studies employing different methods of payment and found that 
individuals would be willing to pay twice as much if the method of payment were an 
income tax as opposed to any other method (e.g., consumer price increases, trip 
expenditures).  Bergstrom et al (2004) conducted a combination dichotomous 
choice/open-ended CV study valuing groundwater in Maine and Georgia and found 
through a split-sample survey design that respondents are willing to pay more to improve 
water quality through a tax reallocation than through a special tax.28  The tax reallocation 
asked respondents to trade off improved groundwater with a reduction in other public 
                                                
28 The hypothesis of equal willingness to pay for both the special tax and tax reallocation was rejected for 
both the open-ended and dichotomous choice elicitation mechanisms.   
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goods (purposefully kept vague to reduce protest behavior) that are funded by general 
taxes.  A working paper by Nunes and Travisi (2006) examined the effect of different 
payment vehicles in their choice experiment that values railway noise reduction.  They 
also find evidence that respondents are willing to pay more for the same amount of noise 
reduction if the reduction is financed through a reallocation of the public budget rather 
than through a new local tax.  In contrast to Bergstrom et al, they specify how the 
reallocation of the public budget would occur and find that respondents would prefer that 
noise reduction be achieved through a decrease in public administration rather than 
through public transport.   
 
1.6.3 Willingness to Pay Calculations 
The primary objective of the study is to calculate the publics willingness to pay 
for air quality improvements in order to rank competing policy options.  Willingness to 
pay is calculated for both marginal and discrete changes.  Marginal willingness to pay for 
visibility and healthy days is constructed by dividing the attribute coefficient by each of 
the three payment coefficients, with results presented in Table 1.6.  Confidence intervals 
are constructed around the median marginal willingness to pay measure using the 
simulation method of Krinsky and Robb (1986).   
Results indicate that the public in general is willing to pay to improve air quality, 
but this willingness to pay depends on the method of payment.  For example, the model 
with triangularly distributed benefits indicates that the typical household would be 
willing to pay $18.94 for a 1-mile improvement in visibility if paid through an inspection 
and maintenance program, $13.97 if paid through an increase in the price of gasoline, and  
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 Table 1.6  Marginal Willingness to Pay ($) 
 Visibility  Days 
 Gas IM Electric 
Bill 
 Gas IM Electric 
Bill 
















        

















        
















        
Entries in table are median estimates derived by the Krinsky and Robb method.  95% confidence 
intervals are in parentheses. 
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only $8.04 if paid through an increase in the households electricity bill.  For an extra 
healthy day per year, households are willing to pay $10.53 if paid through vehicle 
inspection and maintenance, $7.81 if paid through an increase in the price of gasoline, 
and $4.47 if paid through an increase in the electricity bill.  The log-normal model 
indicates lower median willingness to pay for air quality benefits compared to the 
triangular model, although confidence intervals are somewhat larger.  While vehicle 
inspection is again the preferred method of payment, in this model there is no clear 
preference between raising gas prices and increasing the electricity bill.  As already 
shown, the model with normally distributed benefits stipulates that some portion of the 
sample actually derives negative utility from improved air quality.  While median 
willingness to pay from this model is in general only somewhat lower than the triangular 
models, the consequence of normal distributions is more readily seen in the much wider 
confidence intervals.   
To illustrate how choice experiments can provide information on the desirability 
of any policy spanned by the levels of the attributes, willingness to pay for discrete 
changes in visibility and the number of healthy days were also calculated.  Two levels of 
benefits were specified: a medium level with an improvement in visibility of 7 miles 
and an increase of 24 healthy days per year, and a high level with an improvement in 
visibility of 15 miles and an increase of 32 healthy days per year (the high level 
comprises the upper bound of the attribute levels).  Total willingness to pay is found by 
using Hanemanns (1984) formula for compensating surplus.  In this case the status quo 
is not zero due to existing federal actions that will improve visibility by one mile and the 
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number of healthy days by 16, even without any additional local action to reduce 
emissions.   
Table 1.7 reports total willingness to pay estimates for the medium and high level 
of benefits.  Again, these results suggest that households are willing to pay for 
improvements in healthy days and visibility, and that they would rather pay for these 
benefits with a vehicle inspection program or higher gas price than with a higher 
electricity bill.  For example, in the triangular model (Model 1), compensating surplus for 
policy options that result in 32 additional healthy days per year and 15 miles of additional 
visibility would be worth approximately $434 if payment were made through vehicle 
inspection, but only $184 if achieved by an increase in the electricity bill.  The same 
qualitative differences between models in calculating marginal willingness to pay also 
occur in measuring total willingness to pay. 
The ability to compute willingness to pay for any state of the world that 
encompasses the range of attribute levels is an advantage of choice experiments.  Not 
only can policymakers rank different policy options that are currently available, but can 
also compute willingness to pay for scenarios that materialize with additional 
information.  This method also lends itself to providing a measure of benefits in cost 
benefit analysis. 
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Table 1.7  Total Willingness to Pay ($) 
 Medium Benefits  High Benefits 
 Gas IM Electric 
Bill 
 Gas IM Electric 
Bill 





































        


















        
Entries in table are median estimates derived by the Krinsky and Robb method.  95% confidence 
intervals are in parentheses.  Medium benefits are an increase of 24 healthy days and 7 miles 




The results of this study indicate that choice experiments are a powerful method 
of determining the preferred set of options for policymakers facing many possible 
pollution reduction measures.  By using choice experiments, policymakers are able to 
rank policy options and choose the combination of measures that maximizes welfare as 
well as meeting air quality standards.  In one application choice experiments can 
encompass a wide range of options that could facilitate the choice of policy as more 
information on the effects of different control measures becomes available.  This method 
is particularly beneficial for policymakers in EPA nonattainment areas who have 
substantial flexibility in determining which emission reduction measures to undertake in 
order to achieve compliance with air quality standards.  This is not a trivial observation 
considering that there are approximately 150 ozone nonattainment counties and 224 
particulate matter nonattainment counties with this kind of flexibility.   
The present study of Knoxville, TN indicates that households would receive 
substantial welfare gains if air quality were improved, and that willingness to pay is 
sensitive to the method of payment.  Requiring vehicle inspection seems to be the 
payment method to which households are least averse, more than doubling willingness to 
pay estimates when it is employed rather than an increase in the household electricity bill.  
This finding has important implications for future choice experiments.  In particular, 
future applications should be explicit about the payment mechanism and policymakers 
should acknowledge that results could vary on this basis.  
The ability to rank payment options gives policymakers valuable information in 
determining the appropriate course of action.  For example, if it is determined that 
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instituting a vehicle inspection and maintenance program and reformulated gasoline is 
sufficient to bring the area into attainment, requiring additional controls on power plants 
would be inefficient since the residents express the lowest WTP values when this 
payment vehicle is imposed.  The valuation of attributes is also important for determining 
total benefits to an area for coming into attainment with the EPA standards.  Although it 
was not known at the time the study was conducted how much healthy days and visibility 
would improve in the Knoxville area once it achieved attainment, the choice experiment 
framework allows for the calculation of total benefits once these levels are determined 
(provided the span of attributes encompasses this range).   
A caveat to this conclusion is the uncertainty regarding whether sensitivity to the 
payment vehicle is a result of survey framing since not all costs were expressed as 
household expenditures per year, although the preamble to the survey questions did 
express this.  Future research will test sensitivity to such differences in the presentation of 
choice sets.  It is also important to realize that the willingness to pay measures derived 
from this application are short run benefits.  In the long run we would expect for 
individuals to change their behavior in order to lower costs (e.g., buy a hybrid car to 
reduce gasoline costs). 
This study also takes preliminary steps to account for sample selection bias in a 
mixed logit framework.  As this model represents the new standard in analysis of 
multinomial choice data, it is imperative that methods are found to alleviate bias that 
results when the decision to respond to the survey is correlated in an unknown way with 
the choice of policy options.  While the present study is inconclusive due to the lack of 
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convergence of the sample selection model, the demonstrated method is a promising tool 
for addressing this problem.  Future research will examine the properties of this model. 
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CHAPTER 2:  INDUCED-VALUE TESTS OF THE INCENTIVE 




2.1  Introduction 
 
Stated preference methods, in particular contingent valuation (CV) and more 
recently choice experiments (CE), have been used extensively to elicit values for 
environmental goods for use in benefit-cost analyses and natural resource damage 
litigation.  While CV and CE differ in design, both methods use surveys to determine 
how respondents trade off a good and money, although no exchange of money actually 
takes place.  These methods afford the analyst a great degree of control in survey design, 
can value potential changes in environmental quality that may not exist in reality, and can 
assess passive use values such as the existence value arising from the protection of an 
endangered species.   
The most common type of stated preference method to value environmental 
amenities is contingent valuation (CV), where respondents are given information 
regarding a proposed improvement to the good and asked what they would willing to pay 
to realize this change.  Initial applications of the method asked open-ended willingness to 
pay (e.g., How much would you be willing to pay to provide this hiking trail?), while 
more recent applications typically ask a dichotomous choice question (e.g., Would you 
be willing to pay $x to provide this hiking trail?  Please circle yes or no.)  In the 1990s 
environmental economists began exploring choice experiments as an alternative to 
contingent valuation in valuing environmental amenities.  Choice experiments are 
derived from conjoint analysis, which has been used extensively in the marketing and 
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transportation literature since the 1970s to estimate relative values of a goods attributes.  
Like contingent valuation, this method can estimate use as well as non-use values.  
Choice experiments are based on the assumption that individuals derive utility not from a 
good itself, but from its constituent attributes (Lancaster, 1966).  The technique, 
developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982) and Louviere and Woodworth (1983), 
consists of presenting respondents with a choice set of options comprised of attributes 
with varying levels, and elicits the most preferred option from the choice set.  In this way 
choice experiments are similar to real world purchase decisions where consumers are 
presented with a variety of goods characterized by different attribute levels and choose 
whatever gives them the most satisfaction.  To identify relative attribute values several 
questions are asked per application.  Environmental applications include the valuation of 
rivers (Morrison and Bennett, 2004), global warming mitigation options (Layton and 
Brown, 2000), remnant vegetation (Blamey et al, 2000), water supply options (Blamey et 
al, 1999), polluted beaches and rivers (Garrod and Willis, 1999), caribou habitat 
(Adamowicz et al, 1998), and freshwater recreation (Adamowicz et al, 1994). 
Choice experiments (CE) have been proposed as an alternative to the contingent 
valuation (CV) method for valuing public goods for two primary reasons.  First, choice 
experiments are potentially more cost-effective than CV since multiple attributes of a 
good can be simultaneously valued within a single application, facilitating benefit 
transfer applications.  Second, choice experiments may also avoid yea-saying and 
anchoring that have been shown to cause hypothetical bias in dichotomous choice CV 
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applications.29  With an orthogonal design of option attributes (including price) and a task 
that requires respondents to choose the most preferred outcome rather than answering a 
yes or no question regarding willingness to pay, it may be less clear to respondents 
which option is the best for the environment or how much a particular environmental 
improvement should cost.  However, response rates depend on complexity of the survey 
format, and choice experiments impose a heavier cognitive burden by requiring 
respondents to compare levels of multiple attributes across options over a series of choice 
questions.  In addition, DeShazo and Ferma (2002) have shown that choice 
inconsistencies may result from the choice set complexity.   
   Relatively few studies have been conducted to test the incentive properties of 
choice experiments.  An incentive compatible elicitation mechanism is one where the 
decision maker can do no better than to truthfully reveal her preferences, i.e. there is no 
strategic incentive to lie.  In order for survey questions to provide results consistent with 
economic theory, Carson, Groves and Machina (2000) assert that these questions must be 
consequential, which they define by two criteria: (1) a respondent cares about the 
potential policy to be enacted and (2) she believes her approval of a policy increases the 
probability of policy implementation.  Other necessary conditions for a stated preference 
question to be incentive compatible are that the government can coercively collect 
payment upon policy implementation, the good cannot be provided in any other way, and 
that the stated preference question involve only two choices.  Carson et al (2004) find 
empirical evidence that respondent decisions are invariant to the stochastic nature of their 
                                                
29 Yea-saying occurs when the respondent misrepresents his preferences in order to please the experimenter 
or conform to social norms.  Anchoring occurs when the respondent uses the payment stated in the survey 
as the basis for determining his willingness to pay. 
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influence on policy outcomes, as long as the probability of policy implementation 
increases with respondent approval.  Other evidence supporting the notion of 
consequentiality includes research by Liu et al (2006) that finds systematic differences in 
the distribution of willingness to pay between respondents who state that they believe a 
valuation study is inconsequential and others in the study.   
Most studies examining the incentive properties of choice experiments look for 
evidence of hypothetical bias where perceived response incentives may deviate from 
those in an analogous situation with direct financial implications.30  Carlsson and 
Martinsson (2001) test the validity of choice experiments with donations for 
environmental projects, and find no differences between actual and hypothetical marginal 
willingness to pay.  Lusk and Schroeder (2004) find that hypothetical choices 
overestimate total willingness to pay for a private good, beef steaks, but that marginal 
willingness to pay for a change in steak quality is generally not significantly different 
across hypothetical and actual settings.  Carlsson et al (2005) find that the estimated 
marginal willingness to pay for food is significantly lower when a cheap talk script is 
used in the survey instrument.31  List et al (2006) find no evidence of hypothetical bias 
(with or without cheap talk) in the marginal willingness to pay for attributes of baseball 
cards.  In addition, they find that responses elicited for the provision of a public good 
(contributions to the University of Central Floridas Center for Environmental Policy 
Analysis) were not significantly different between real and hypothetical cheap talk 
                                                
30 See Murphy et al (2004) and List and Gallet (2001) for meta-analyses of hypothetical bias in stated 
preference valuation. 
31 Cheap talk refers to providing survey recipients with information regarding the tendency of overstating 
willingness to pay in a survey format.  This script is provided before respondents are asked their 
willingness to pay. 
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treatments, although subjects were more likely to donate if the treatment were 
hypothetical without cheap talk.   
Two studies of choice experiments have been conducted in a classroom setting.  
Boyle et al (2006) seek to explain the discrepancy of value estimates between choice 
experiments32 and contingent valuation by examining various provision rules.  They 
describe three provision rule treatments: an individual provision rule that implements the 
option that an individual actually chose, a group provision rule that implements the 
option receiving the most support regardless if it was chosen by a particular subject, and 
no provision rule that is intended to mimic field applications of choice experiments.  
Their results suggest that the inclusion of the individual provision rule significantly 
reduces the number of subjects who opt-in to the market for a private good, T-shirts, 
relative to the group provision rule and no provision rule treatments.  In valuing a real-
world public good, a local non-profit organization called Trees Atlanta that plants trees in 
the Atlanta metro area, they find that the group provision rule and no provision rule 
treatments yield higher marginal values than either the real or hypothetical individual 
provision rule treatments.  The only test of the incentive compatibility of choice 
experiments using induced values in a lab setting is concurrent research by Carson et al 
(2006).  They test if the rate of non-demand revealing responses significantly differs 
across elicitation formats that vary by the number of options (dichotomous choice vs. 
trichotomous choice) and the number of choice sets (single vs. repeated).  They find that 
while the frequency of violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the 
                                                
32 In their paper, as elsewhere in the discrete choice literature, choice experiments is referred to as choice 
modeling.  Choice experiments have also been referred to as conjoint-based choice experiments. 
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multiple choice treatments are not significant, the rate of non-demand revelation in the 
repeated trichotomous choice treatment is significantly higher than in the repeated 
dichotomous choice treatment.   
The main shortcoming of this literature, from the purview of this paper, is a lack 
of studies that employ both a hypothetical and a real payment scenario that are 
theoretically incentive compatible, at least under plausible assumptions.  Without 
incentive compatibility, or at least a strong foundation of the incentive properties of the 
elicitation mechanisms in both hypothetical and real payment settings, it is difficult to 
decipher what is driving observed differences between the two.  Further, absent incentive 
compatibility and individual rationality, it is impossible to know whether the observed 
results will be replicable.  The vast majority of studies exploring hypothetical bias use a 
purely hypothetical setting, for which incentive compatibility seems very unlikely.  
Carson et al (2004) show that this has a dramatic effect on survey responses, with 
respondents answering a dichotomous choice referendum-type CV question differently 
depending on whether there is a positive probability that the vote will be binding.  
Certainly in field surveys, respondents are at least generally led to believe that policy 
may be influenced by survey responses and thus may not treat the survey as a purely 
hypothetical exercise.   
This study offers a fresh perspective on hypothetical bias by testing the choice 
experiment format for incentive compatibility in an induced-value, laboratory setting.  
The laboratory experiments compare the performance of dichotomous choice and 
trichotomous choice questions across three real payment provision rules: plurality voting 
(PV), a vague decision rule based solely on respondent decisions (V1), and a vague 
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decision rule based on both respondent decisions and the actions of the implementing 
agency (V2).  The plurality vote rule serves as a benchmark.  The induced value 
framework used in the study serves to mitigate confounding factors that appear to plague 
many of the previous studies on hypothetical bias such as participant altruism and 
attitudes toward risk.  Participants do not know the range or distribution of group values 
so they cannot discern which response would improve the payoff of other subjects, and 
subjects have no incentive to engage in risk-averse or risk-loving behavior since values 
are certain across all treatments. 
While the typical CE field application does not explicitly contain or infer a 
decision rule describing how responses affect a goods provision (as opposed to a CV 
referendum-type dichotomous choice question), respondents are generally informed that 
survey responses will be taken into consideration in the policymaking process.  It 
therefore seems reasonable to believe that CE applications meet Carson, Groves, and 
Machinas requirement of consequentiality, although the respondent is uncertain as to 
how much influence her responses will have on eventual policy outcomes.  The vague 
decision rule treatments in the laboratory experiment therefore give subjects incomplete 
information to parallel field applications where respondents may be relatively uninformed 
about how their responses map into agency actions as opposed to a political election or 
debated public referendum.  Polome (2003) also explores the performance of this kind of 
provision rule in an induced value dichotomous choice CV experiment.  The vague 
provision rule used in his study asks respondents to make their decisions as if the 
provision rule were a referendum, but notes that a different kind of provision rule could 
be used ex ante.  He finds that while only half of the subjects truthfully revealed their 
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willingness to pay, deviations from theory were not correlated with induced values, 
suggesting that deviations may occur from some individual behavioral characteristics.    
This study investigates the theoretical properties of both dichotomous choice and 
trichotomous choice elicitation formats under plurality voting rules and more generally 
under the assumption that the respondent perceives her decision to have some influence 
on the outcome.  It is well-known that multiple choice formats cannot be incentive 
compatible without placing restrictions on preferences (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 
1975).33  However, the trichotomous choice format is incentive compatible when certain 
assumptions are made on the prior beliefs an individual has about the preferences of 
others, such as if the respondent believes each option has equal support from the group.  
This kind of belief seems plausible in the context of a field survey where, unlike a 
political race, there is no clear signal about the preferences of other survey respondents.  
However, certain belief structures, such as believing the majority of respondents prefer 
that no action is taken, can give rise to status quo bias, which is often an issue of concern 
in choice experiment applications.  Status quo bias reflects the tendency of individuals to 
have an endowment effect for the current state and to require compensation to undertake 
an action, even one that would otherwise leave utility unchanged.  The experimental 
design allows for direct tests of status quo bias by including choice sets with a status quo 
option where all participants receive a positive return and alternative option(s) that result 
in gains and losses relative to the status quo.  The empirical analysis focuses on the 
demand revealing properties of the elicitation mechanisms, the effects of vague provision 
rules on responses, and tests of status quo bias. 
                                                
33 Multiple choice formats refer to choice situations with more than two alternatives. 
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The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2.2 explores the theoretical basis for 
incentive compatibility of dichotomous and trichotomous choice elicitation formats, 
Section 2.3 describes the experimental design, Section 2.4 presents empirical results and 
Section 2.5 concludes. 
Results indicate that certain belief structures can lead to incentive compatible 
outcomes in a trichotomous choice format, depending on how a respondent believes the 
agency will incorporate respondent decisions into the provision of a public good.  While 
experimental evidence shows that both dichotomous and trichotomous formats can lead 
to accurate assessments of willingness to pay, the trichotomous choice format 
surprisingly had fewer deviations from theory and was less subject to status quo bias.  Of 
particular interest is the presence of fewer deviations from theory in the CE dichotomous 
choice format relative to empirical studies of dichotomous choice contingent valuation.  
This suggests that CV applications may be improved by adopting the attribute-based CE 
format for two options. 
 
2.2  Theoretically Incentive Compatible Elicitation Mechanisms 
 
One argument for the choice of the dichotomous choice referendum elicitation 
format in contingent valuation is the well-known result of its incentive compatibility, 
provided that the agency can compel payment if the good is provided and that a single 
issue is involved (Carson, Groves, and Machina, 2000).  This result is not restricted to 
binding plurality vote mechanisms, but occurs as long as the survey instrument is 
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consequential (the respondent believes there is a non-zero probability that her responses 
will influence the agencys action). 
What of the incentive compatibility of a choice set with three alternatives?  It is 
well-known that any mechanism other than a binary response cannot be incentive 
compatible without restricting agent preferences (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975).   
The question, then, is to what degree agent preferences must be restricted to achieve an 
incentive compatible outcome or under what circumstances this outcome is likely to 
occur.  The voting literature states that an expected utility maximizing agent who faces 
three choices with a simple plurality winner will generally limit her choice to the two 
options that provide the highest unconditional expected utility.  Affecting the 
respondents strategic response is her preferred choice, her expectation of what others 
will choose, and her perception of how the agency will aggregate and incorporate survey 
data in policy decisions.  In a political context such as the dominant two-party structure in 
the U.S., this typically implies that while a third party candidate may be the voters 
preferred choice, the voter will likely select one of the major two party candidates since 
she believes (possibly from the common release of public opinion polls) only they have a 
realistic chance of winning.  Stated preference surveys, on the other hand, usually inquire 
about the provision of public goods, with which respondents may be less familiar than 
political races and consequently have fewer prior beliefs about which options are most 
likely to be enacted.   
Following McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972), an agent derives utility from each 
option available.  When faced with three choices, she will compare her expected utility 
from her unconditional top two choices, denoted options 1 and 2.  Assuming risk 
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neutrality, this is equivalent to comparing her expected payoffs from her unconditional 
top two choices.  Letting 1E  and 2E  represent her expected payoffs from choosing 
options 1 and 2 respectively, we have: 
( ) ( )311321121 bbpbbpE −+−=    (2.1) 
( ) ( )322312122 bbpbbpE −+−=    (2.2) 
where ib  denotes the respondents payoff if option i is implemented and ijp  is the pivot 
probability between options i and j.  The pivot probability represents the probability that 
an agent will be decisive in breaking a tie between the two options.  Given this notation, 
the respondents decision rule can be written as follows: 
If 021 >− EE , choose option 1 
If 021 <− EE , choose option 2 
where 
)()()(2 32233113211221 bbpbbpbbpEE −−−+−=−  (2.3) 
If the respondent strategically chooses the option that provides the highest payoff 
ib , then the elicitation mechanism can be characterized as incentive compatible.  
However, the respondent may select his second-most preferred option due to the impact 
of the pivot probabilities in (2.3).  We assume the pivot probabilities depend on 
respondent beliefs about the likelihood that the agency will implement either option so 
that: 
( ) ( )[ ]⋅⋅= jiij AAfp ,  
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where Ai is the perceived likelihood that the agency will implement option i.  Ai depends 
on the respondents beliefs regarding the total voter support of the option (including her 
own choice), denoted Ti, as well as other factors, Yi, that measure the strength of 
policymaker preferences (independent from voter preferences) for option i.34  The 
provision rule, denoted r, is expected to impact both total voter support as well as Yi.  
Therefore,  
 ( ) ( )( )rYrTAA iiii ,=  
and 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]rYrTArYrTAfp jjjiiiij ,,,= . 
The provision rule describes how the agency will use respondent choices to 
determine a policy strategy and determines whether other factors besides votes, such as 
policymaker preferences, can influence the agency decision.  If a survey is thought to be 
inconsequential, as would be the case if the survey were purely methodological and 
respondents were told that responses would not be used as an input to any policy making, 
the pivot probabilities between any two choices would be zero and theory has little to say 
about what is driving responses.  Studies that use purely hypothetical treatment to explore 
bias are thereby flawed.   
The CE format generally has three options  the status quo and two generic 
departures from the status quo.  If the survey is carefully designed to ensure the 
plausibility of any of these options so the respondent does not simply dismiss an option 
out-of-hand, it is reasonable that in many cases prior beliefs may be uniformly distributed 
                                                
34 For example, policymaker preferences could depend on the cost of implementing the option, the 
timeframe of implementation, or other political considerations. 
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among the options.  This is because, unlike public referenda, there is generally little 
publicity surrounding policies in valuation surveys and hence only crude information, 
such as beliefs about the distribution of environmental preferences, from which to form a 
reasonable prior.  The experimental design of CE applications may render beliefs as 
relatively uninformative since attribute levels are systematically varied, making options 
more difficult to categorize.  For example, a CE application related to air quality 
improvements might define options with the following attributes: the number of healthy 
days per year, improvement in scenic visibility per year, and a cost measure such as an 
increase in yearly electricity bills.  To enable statistical identification, levels of the 
attributes vary orthogonally such that respondents who in general want better air quality 
must still trade off the two attributes of air quality (assuming that the number of healthy 
days and visibility are not perfectly correlated).  This kind of variation may make it 
difficult to determine how other respondents will choose between the options, as well as 
to determine how the agency will use a sequence of such choices.  Given the assumption 
of uninfomed prior beliefs across options, we show in the next section that under certain 
circumstances, the trichotomous choice format can be incentive compatible.   
It is possible, however, that respondents may have prior beliefs regarding the 
status quo option that is typically present in CE applications.  Respondents may feel that 
the status quo is unlikely and thus only choose between the other two action options, or 
may believe that the cost associated with an action alternative understates the true cost 
and so chooses the status quo even if one of the action alternatives would be preferable.  
Consequently researchers should evaluate on a case-by-case basis the likelihood of prior 
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beliefs causing strategic departures from the truthful revelation of preferences and strive 
to ensure the plausibility of all options, including the status quo.   
 
2.3  Experimental Design 
 
One hundred and ninety-six students were recruited at the University of 
Tennessee in the spring of 2006.  Experiments were conducted in a laboratory setting, in 
groups ranging in size from five to twenty.  Each participant received an initial balance of 
$7, with final earnings determined by the option implemented for everyone in the group.  
Experiments were short, lasting no more than 45 minutes.   
Comparing the performance of dichotomous choice (DC) with trichotomous 
choice (TC) across three provision rules, there are six treatments.  Each participant was 
given a copy of the instructions pertaining to the relevant treatment, which were read 
aloud in each session.  Instructions described how six choice questions would be 
presented, with each question consisting of a set of options.  Each option specified how 
many units of two goods would be provided and the total cost associated with their 
provision.  The two goods were labeled as Red and Blue, and were worth money to 
participants, based on their induced values, if provided.  An example of a choice question 
was given to demonstrate the outcomes in terms of the number of Red and Blue goods 
provided and the cost of provision for all options within the question.  The DC format 
consisted of two options, while the TC format consisted of three options per choice set.  
The structure of the TC choice set is similar to how a choice set is presented in a field 
survey.  Each choice set contained a status quo option where one unit of both Red and 
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Blue goods was provided at zero cost.  Having positive levels of the number of goods in 
the status quo option was designed to mimic field applications where some amount of a 
public good will be provided regardless of policy action, and researchers are attempting 
to discover if there is support for additional amounts of the good.  The status quo was the 
same for all questions while the attributes in the other options varied per question.  
Participants were told that one of the options would be implemented for everyone in the 
experiment based on choices made by everyone in the experiment, and were shown how 
earnings would be calculated for this implemented option.  To control for order effects, 
each treatment was subdivided into five orderings of questions.  Subjects were told that 
for a particular question everyone faces the same options, but that everyone would not 
see the questions in the same order.  Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 provide examples of the 
choice question in the DC and TC formats. 
To ensure that participants understood earnings calculations, another example 
choice question was presented to respondents followed by questions regarding their 
earnings if a particular option were implemented.  For the DC format respondents were 
asked to calculate earnings for the two options in the choice set, while the TC format 
required earnings calculations for all three options.  All participants were checked by the 
experimenter before being able to continue with the experiment.  Those subjects who 
calculated earnings for each option correctly earned $2. 
Subjects were then told how an option would be implemented according to the 
provision rule associated with the subjects treatment.  After answering all six choice 
questions, a volunteer rolled a six-sided die to determine which choice question would be 
used to calculate earnings.  The outcome determined by the provision rule was announced  
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Suppose the following two options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 




Option A Option B: 
Status Quo 
Number of Red goods provided  





Total cost per person $4 $0 
 
I would choose: Option A Option B 
 
Figure 2.1: Dichotomous Choice Sample Question 
 
 
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 










Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $4 $6 $0 
 
I choose: Option A Option B Option C
 
Figure 2.2: Trichotomous Choice Sample Question 
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to the group who could then calculate earnings for the session.  The experiment 
concluded with a questionnaire that gathered basic demographics and information on the 
number of economics classes taken, previous knowledge of public goods, academic 
major, prior voting in state/national elections, and the degree to which the subject 
understood the experiment instructions. 
 
2.3.1  Induced Values 
Subjects received a Value Card indicating their per-unit induced value for Red 
and Blue goods and describing how their earnings are calculated for any option that is 
implemented.  Subjects were told that not everyone had the same values, so that they 
should closely examine their values and not reveal them to anyone in the group.  Subjects 
were not told the range or distribution of values for participants in their group.  Subjects 
received induced values of $1, $2, or $3 for the Red and Blue goods, with all 
combinations used in the design except for ($3.00, $3.00) for a total of 8 sets of induced 
values. 
 
2.3.2  Factorial Design of Options 
Each option consisted of three attributes: the number of Red and Blue units 
provided and the total cost of the option.  For options other than the status quo, each 
attribute had two levels.  The number of Red goods could equal either 1 or 2, the number 
of Blue goods could equal 1 or 3, and the total cost could equal $2.50 or $4.00.  The full 
factorial of options for the DC format is therefore 23 = 8, and 23x2 = 64 for the TC format.  
After deleting options that were either dominated by the other options (e.g., one unit each 
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of Red and Blue goods were provided but at a positive cost) or duplicate another choice 
set but with a different order of options, six choice sets were available for the DC format 
and seven choice sets remained for the TC format.  In order to keep the number of 
questions constant between treatments, six questions were used for both DC and TC 
formats.  
 
2.3.3  Provision Rules 
2.3.3.1  Plurality Vote Provision Rule 
The plurality vote rule is straightforward: the option that receives the most votes 
is implemented for everyone in the group.  The DC plurality vote rule serves as the 
benchmark since it is well-established that a theoretical incentive compatible elicitation 
in a stated preference survey requires a one-shot DC question coupled with a coercive 
provision rule such as a referendum vote (Carson, Groves, and Machina, 2000).  In a TC 
context, the incentive compatibility of the plurality rule relies on respondent beliefs.  In 
the model discussed previously, these beliefs are manifested in the pivot probabilities.  
Because the plurality rule only relies on other voters as determinants of a goods 
provision, the decision of the respondent will be based on her preferences and what she 
believes are the preferences of the other people in the group.  The belief regarding the 
agencys likelihood of implementing a particular option, then, is reduced from 
( ) ( )( )rYrTAA iiii ,=  to ( )( )rTAA iii = .  To operationalize equation (2.3), assume that the 
net payoff of option i can be represented as: ib = ×redV  ired  + ×blueV  iblue   
iCost where redV  and blueV  are the per-unit induced values for Red and Blue goods, ired  
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and iblue  are the number of Red and Blue goods provided in option i, and iCost  is the 
total cost of providing option i.  In general, the pivot probability between options i and j 
can be rewritten as the absolute value of the difference between the probability that an 
option will be implemented when the respondent chooses option i: ijp = abs [prob(i + 1)  
prob(j)] where prob(i + 1) represents the probability that option i is implemented given 
the respondent chooses it and prob(j) represents the probability that option j is 
implemented.  Suppose that there are N participants in the group with a choice set of 
three options and that 1N  represents the number of votes for option 1, 2N  the number of 
votes for option 2, and 3N  the number of votes for option 3.  The probability then that 
option i is implemented is the probability that iN  > jN  for ji ≠ .  If the respondent 
believes that preferences among the three options are distributed uniformly so that, 
without his vote, 1N  = 2N  = 3N , then ijp  = 1 since iN  = jN .  In other words, if the 
respondent believes that preferences are distributed uniformly across each option, then 
the probability that he is pivotal becomes 1.  According to (2.3), he would then choose 
the option that yields the highest payoff.  Since the range of induced values is unknown 
and generic goods are used in the experiment, we therefore expected that subjects would 
answer truthfully under this provision rule.   
 
2.3.3.2 Vague Provision Rule (V1) 
The vague provision rule (V1) again limits the agency to depend solely on 
respondent decisions for implementation of the good, but is not as straightforward as the 
plurality voting rule.  Subjects were instructed that the experimenters will place poker 
67 
chips in a bag according to the option that each subject selected for the choice question 
that is used to determine experiment earnings.  For example, if the subject chose Option 
A, the experimenters placed a white chip in the bag, a black chip was placed in the bag if 
Option B were chosen, and if the treatment was trichotomous choice, a green chip was 
placed in the bag for Option C.  A volunteer then drew a poker chip out of the bag, and 
the color of the drawn chip determined which option was implemented for the entire 
group.  This provision rule satisfies the consequentiality requirement of Carson, Groves, 
and Machina since the subjects choice increases the probability of implementation, but 
allows more subject uncertainty than the simple plurality voting rule in how responses 
lead to public good provision.  This rule may more closely mimic field applications of 
choice experiments where respondents are led to believe that their decisions will be 
considered in the policymaking process but do not know how much influence their 
responses have.   
Following the model discussed previously, subjects would take into consideration 
beliefs about how others in the group are choosing options as well as how they believe 
the agency (the experiment coordinators) will use respondent decisions.  The uncertainty 
of this rule is reflected in how the total number of votes for option i, Ti, affects the 
probability that option i is implemented, Ai.  Obviously Ti will affect Ai less under this 
provision rule than the plurality voting rule, reducing the respondents pivot probability 
(assuming again that subjects in this experiment essentially have no informative beliefs 
regarding relative support for each option among other subjects).  While the probability 
of implementation increases with a subjects vote, the probability that a subject is pivotal 
decreases with this rule compared with the plurality rule.  Assuming again that 
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preferences are uniformly distributed, the pivot probability now becomes: ijp  = 
abs[( iN + 1)/N  jN /N] = 1/N since iN  = jN .  While it would still be in the best interest 
of the subject to reveal her true preferences according to (2.3), the incentive to do so may 
be weakened relative to the plurality rule since she has less of a chance of being pivotal 
between options.   
 
2.3.3.3  Vague with Regulator Provision Rule (V2)  
The vague with regulator provision rule (V2) is similar to the vague provision 
rule, but now provision depends only partially on respondent decisions.  Subjects were 
again instructed that different colored chips would be placed in the bag according to their 
choice for the randomly chosen question (white for Option A, black for Option B, and, if 
a trichotomous choice treatment, green for Option C), but now additional blue chips 
would be added by the experimenter.  The number of blue chips added by the 
experimenter would equal the number of people in the group, so half of the chips in the 
bag come from subject decisions and half come from the experimenter.  If the chip 
randomly drawn from the bag were a blue chip, the experimenter then revealed whether 
Option A, Option B, or in the trichotomous choice format, Option C was to be 
implemented.  Subjects were told that the experimenter had written down on a piece of 
paper the option that corresponds to a blue chip being drawn, and were shown that folded 
piece of paper during the instructions.  The option was kept secret until a blue chip was 
drawn at the end of the experiment.  Sample instructions for this provision rule within the 
trichotomous choice elicitation format are included in Appendix D. 
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This provision rule intends to capture uncertainty respondents have in actual 
choice experiments over preferences of the implementing agency, as well as those of 
other respondents.  Again assuming that subjects have uninformative beliefs regarding 
others in the group (and hence assume a uniform distribution of preferences), incentive 
compatibility relies on the effect of subjects beliefs about the likelihood of agency 
implementation on the pivot probabilities between options.  Like the vague rule, this rule 
reduces the impact of voters on the pivot probability relative to the plurality rule.  
However, the respondent now considers other factors Y, which may increase or decrease 
the pivot probability relative to the vague rule.  If the subject believes that the regulator 
will choose option i, the pivot probability becomes: ijp  = abs[( iN + N +1)/(2N)  
jN /(2N)] = (N+1)/(2N) since iN  = jN , which is greater than the pivot probability under 
the vague rule.  If the subject believes the regulator will choose option j, then ijp  = (N -
1)/(2N), which again is greater than the pivot probability under the vague rule if N > 3.  If 
the subject believes the regulator will choose an option other than i or j, then ijp  = 
1/(2N).  The latter belief results in a lower pivot probability relative to the vague rule.  
While the incentive remains to truthfully reveal preferences regardless of the belief 
regarding agency implementation (assuming uniformly distributed preferences among 
subjects), it cannot be predicted a priori whether V1 or V2 has the stronger incentive 
without making assumptions regarding which option subjects believe the regulator will 
choose.  For example, if subjects believe the regulators are equally likely to choose any 
of the three options, then ijp  = abs[( iN + N/3 +1)/(2N)  ( jN +N/3)/(2N)] = 1/(2N) since 
iN  = jN , and we would predict that V1 would have the stronger incentive than V2.   
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In summary, we would expect to find evidence of incentive compatibility with all 
three provision rules given the assumption of uninformative beliefs regarding other 
voters.  The strongest incentive to reveal preferences occurs under the plurality rule.  We 
cannot predict the relative strength of the incentive to truthfully reveal preferences 
between V1 and V2 unless subjects believe that regulator preferences are uniformly 




Summary statistics on decisions that deviate from theory are presented in Table 
2.1.  Decision deviations are defined as choices that do not conform to theory by 
maximizing payoffs in a particular choice set.  Those DC questions that have equal 
payoffs for both options are excluded from this definition since it is impossible to deviate 
from theory.  Since there were no TC questions that had equal payoffs for all three 
options, all TC questions were included in this metric.  An immediate observation is that, 
contrary to expectations, the TC format has fewer deviations than the DC format across 
all three provision rules, and that V2 has fewer deviations than V1 across elicitation 
formats.  The fact that there were fewer deviations in TC treatments than DC treatments 
is particularly striking since more opportunities exist to make deviations in this format.  
As expected, the plurality vote rule has the fewest deviations across treatments, although 
it is surprising that the TC plurality vote treatment has fewer deviations than the DC 
plurality vote treatment.  Large deviations are defined as those questions where net 
earnings of the alternative chosen are at least $1 less than the next-best alternative.  
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Table 2.1  Deviations from Theory 
Treatment N Deviations Large Deviations 
DCP 34 2.2% 0.5% 
DCV1 31 18.2% 9.7% 
DCV2 31 8.4% 5.9% 
TCP 34 1.0% 0.0% 
TCV1 31 8.6% 4.3% 
TCV2 32 3.1% 0.5% 
Deviation = Alternative chosen does not maximize expected net earnings; Large deviation = Net 
earnings of alternative chosen are at least $1 less than next-best alternative; DCP = Dichotomous 
Choice Plurality Provision Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = 
Dichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP = Trichotomous Choice 
Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 = 
Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule. 
 
One immediate observation involves the rate of deviations in the dichotomous 
choice plurality rule treatment.  This treatment closely resembles referendum CV 
questions since only two options are presented and the option that receives the most 
support is implemented.  As noted in Table 2.1, the rate of deviations is 2.2% (for large 
deviations the rate is 0.5%).  Other induced value studies that test hypothetical 
referendum CV questions have resulted in higher rates: Vossler and McKee (2006) find 
deviation rates of 6.9% (2.1% for large deviations) while Taylor et al (2001) find 
deviation rates of 16.7%.  Since the incentive properties should be the same across 
formats, the discrepancy could partially be explained by the difference in elicitation 
format.  Perhaps the choice experiment framework, where the subject simply picks the 
most preferred option of attributes, leads to a higher rate of demand revelation than the 
CV format that requires an all-or-nothing decision.  Other possible explanations could 
include differences in experimental design such as the distribution of values and costs 
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across the samples or the presence or absence of an example that describes how earnings 
are calculated.   
To enable comparison across treatments in the current study, Table 2.2 reports 
deviations by spread, which is defined as the difference in payoffs between the top two 
alternatives within a choice question.  The DC format had a range of spreads from zero to 
$5.50, while the range of spreads in the TC format extended from zero to $4.50.  The 
table is reported as the percentage of deviations in the number of questions with a 
particular spread.  A spread equal to zero, for example, implies that two options yield the 
same payoffs.  As one would expect, this reduces the chance of deviating in the TC 
format (it is impossible to deviate under the DC format under a zero spread), and indeed 
the percentage of deviations from these types of questions is zero for V1 and V2 
trichotomous choice treatments.  While questions with zero spread account for both 
deviations in the TC plurality rule treatment, the deviations were committed by the same 
individual.  Because no deviations occurred for DC formats at a spread of $5 or $5.50, 
these spreads are not included in the table. 
Table 2.3 presents tests of decision deviations by spread.  All hypotheses are 
tested using the Fisher exact test.  The hypothesis that all DC formats are equal to all TC 
formats is rejected at the 5% significance level for a spread of $1, and at the 10% level at 
a spread of $2, while it cannot be rejected at any other spread.  Under the DC treatment, 
the hypothesis that the plurality rule is equal to V1 can be rejected at the 5% level at a 
spread of $2.00 and at the 10% level for spreads of $1.00 and $3.00.  Under the TC 
treatment this hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level at spreads of $0.50 and $1.00.   
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Table 2.2  Deviations by Spread  
Spread DCP DCV1 DCV2 TCP TCV1 TCV2 
0 NA NA NA 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
0.5 8.3% 23.5% 5.9% 0.0% 14.3% 3.1% 
1.0 4.8% 27.8% 5.6% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
1.5 0.0% 6.9% 10.3% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 
2.0 0.0% 12.1% 12.1% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 
2.5 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
3.0 0.0% 15.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
3.5 0.0% 9.1% 18.2% 0.0% 0.0% 12.5% 
4.0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 
4.5 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Entries in table are the ratios of deviations from theory to the number of questions with a 
particular spread.  Spread = Difference in earnings between top two alternatives; DCP = 
Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice Vague Provision 
Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP = Trichotomous 
Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 = 
Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule; NA = not applicable. 
 
 
Table 2.3  Tests of Deviations by Spread  
 Hypothesis 














0.0 NA NA NA NA 0.492 0.492 NA 
0.5 0.047 0.106 1.000 0.083 0.001 0.240 0.030 
1.0 0.550 0.073 1.000 0.177 0.018 NA 0.047 
1.5 0.461 0.222 0.102 1.000 0.235 NA 0.489 
2.0 0.085 0.050 0.050 1.000 NA 1.000 1.000 
2.5 0.455 0.429 NA 1.000 NA NA NA 
3.0 0.569 0.092 0.465 0.605 NA NA NA 
3.5 0.641 0.478 0.217 1.000 NA 1.000 NA 
4.0 0.543 NA NA NA NA 0.467 0.467 
4.5 NA 0.474 NA 1.000 NA NA NA 
Entries in table provide the Fisher exact p-value.  DCP = Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision 
Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague 
with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP = Trichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = 
Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 = Trichotomous Choice Vague with 
Regulator Provision Rule; NA = not applicable. 
 
74 
The hypothesis that the plurality rule is equal to V2 cannot be rejected for any spread 
under TC, but can be rejected at the 5% level at a spread of $2.00 under DC.  The 
hypothesis that V1 is equal to V2 is rejected for the DC treatment at the 10% level at a 
spread of $0.50, and at a 5% level under TC at spreads of $0.50 and $1.00.  These results 
suggest that there is some evidence that the TC format has significantly fewer deviations 
than the DC format and that the plurality rule treatments do not in general differ from the 
V2 treatments, but do differ from the V1 treatments.  The majority of significant 
differences between the benchmark plurality rule and the other provision rules occur at 
relatively lower spreads where the opportunity cost of deviating from theory is lower.  
To formally model decision deviations, probit models were estimated within and 
across elicitation formats using design conditions and respondent characteristics as 
explanatory variables (see Table 2.4 for definitions of the variables).  Results are 
presented in Table 2.5 as marginal effects for ease of interpretation.  Each participant 
answered six questions, and since it is likely that the unobserved heterogeneity is 
correlated across the responses from the same individual, we arbitrarily allow for this 
type of correlation by using the Huber-White sandwich covariance matrix estimator.  
This is consistent with a random effects type of error structure without assuming the 
random effect is additive with a specific distribution.  The full model consisting of 
observations across elicitation formats suggests that respondents in the TC treatments are 
4.2% less likely to deviate from theory than those in DC treatments, those in the V1 
treatment are 9.4% more likely to deviate than respondents in the plurality treatment, and 
those in the V2 treatment are no more likely to deviate from theory than those in the 
plurality treatment.  While it is unclear why more deviations occurred in the  
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Table 2.4  Description of Explanatory Variables  
Variable name Description Sample Mean 
(std. dev.) 
TC = 1 if elicitation mechanism is 
trichotomous choice 
0.602 (0.489) 
V1 = 1 if provision rule is vague 0.321 (0.467 
V2 = 1 if provision rule is vague with 
regulator 
0.327 (0.469) 
Group Size Number of participants in the subjects 
group 
15.150 (3.553) 
Distance Absolute value of net earnings 3.962 (2.034) 
Spread Difference between earnings of top two 
alternatives within a choice question 
1.463 (1.232) 
Age Subjects age, in years 20.820 (3.461) 
Male = 1 if subject is male 0.618 (0.486) 
Math = 1 if subject has a math-intensive major 
(e.g., engineering, statistics) 
0.413 (0.492) 
Experience = 1 if subject participated in a previous 
economics experiment 
0.757 (0.429) 
Voted  = 1 if subject in any prior state or 
national election 
0.690 (0.463) 
Public Goods = 1 if subject had studied the economics 
of public goods  
0.587 (0.493) 
Constant Alternative specific constant = 1 if choice 
represents an action alternative as 












       
TC  -0.042*     
  (0.024)      
       
V1  0.094**  0.139**  0.045 
  (0.041)  (0.058)  (0.056)  
       
V2  0.046  0.081  0.026 
  (0.034)  (0.055)  (0.038) 
       
Group Size  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
       
Spread  -0.011  -0.019**  -0.004 
  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
       
Age  0.002*  0.004**  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
       
Male  0.012  0.008  0.011 
  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.017) 
       
Experience  -0.020  0.014  -0.051 
  (0.026)  (0.036)  (0.040) 
       
Voted  0.007  0.008  0.006 
  (0.019)  (0.031)  (0.020) 
Model Statistics       





 0.113  0.126 
N  1080  521  559 
Dependent variable = 1 if respondent deviates from theory; = 0 otherwise. Entries in table are 
marginal effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *,**, and *** denote parameter is 
statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  The 
likelihood ratio index provides the percentage increase in the log-likelihood function relative to 
the model estimated with constants only. 
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DC format relative to the TC format, the other results are consistent with the theoretical 
model of voting described earlier.  The addition of poker chips by the experimenters may 
have led some respondents to believe their choice was more pivotal, and consequently 
encouraged the selection of the choice that maximized earnings.  It is harder to explain 
the discrepancy between the TC and DC elicitation formats.  One possibility is that 
participants adopted simple heuristics for questions with only two options while the 
three-option format may have stimulated participants to think about the exercise more 
deeply.  The only other variable significantly affecting the probability of making an error 
is the subjects age, with the probability of deviating from theory increasing by 0.2% with 
each additional year.  None of the other respondent characteristics significantly affected 
the probability of committing a deviation, nor did the number of individuals in a 
particular experimental session. 
Turning now to the DC elicitation format, those in the V1 treatment are 13.9% 
more likely to deviate from theory relative to the plurality group.  The probability of 
deviating decreases in this format by 1.3% for every dollar increase in the difference 
between earnings of the two options.  Older respondents are again more likely to deviate 
from theory in the DC format, as the probability increases by 0.4% for each additional 
year.  None of the explanatory variables significantly impact the probability of deviating 
from theory in the TC elicitation format.   
To further examine evidence of hypothetical and status quo bias, choice models 
were run for all six treatments.  Mixed logit models were used to account for 
heterogeneity of preferences, repeated questions per subject, and to relax the restrictive 
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA) inherent in the commonly used 
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conditional logit model to analyze choice data.  Following Train (2003), utility for person 
n from alternative j can be described as: 
njnjnnj xU εβ +




nβ  is a vector of individual-specific coefficients on observed policy- and individual-
specific variables, β represents the average preferences of the sample, and nβ
~ is the 
stochastic deviation of the respondents tastes relative to average tastes in the sample.  
Instead of being fixed over individuals, these coefficients vary over respondents with 
density )/( θβf  where θ  describes the underlying parameters of the distribution (i.e., 
mean and covariance).  njε  is a random term that is iid extreme value and independent of 
nβ  and njx .  If preferences for a particular attribute are expected to be homogeneous 
across the sample, nβ
~  is simply assumed to be zero.   
The unconditional probability is found by integrating the logit probability over the 
distribution of the random parameters:  



















~ is common over each alternative and individual-specific, the model accounts for 
the panel structure of the data where the same respondent answers several choice 
questions.35  This capability of the model is important since it is reasonable to believe that 
                                                
35 A sequence of choices by the same individual is taken into account by simply including the product of 
logit probabilities over an individuals choice sets in the likelihood function.  
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choices made by the same individual will be influenced by common unobservable 
factors.  The model also relaxes the assumption of the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives inherent in other logit models.  Because the probability of choosing a 
particular alternative involves the integration over the density of the parameters, the ratio 
of probabilities for any two alternatives will depend on the attributes of all alternatives in 
the choice set.  Consequently, more realistic substitution patterns can be generated in this 
model.  To create a mixed logit model, the analyst specifies a distribution for the 
variables that are thought to vary across the sample, and also chooses which parameters 
should be correlated, if any.  Significance of the estimated standard deviation of a random 
parameter indicates that unobserved heterogeneity is present in the sample.  Conversely, 
if the estimated standard deviation is insignificant, preferences for the attribute can be 
assumed to be homogeneous. 
Because induced values for the Red and Blue goods were uniformly distributed 
among subjects, these coefficients were allowed to be random with a uniform 
distribution.  The constant coefficient, which represents an action alternative as 
opposed to the status quo, was allowed to vary randomly with a normal distribution.  
Socioeconomic factors that might impact status quo bias were allowed to interact with the 
mean of the constant term.  Several specifications were attempted, but only age and male 
were found to be significant when interacted with the constant.  Evidence of status quo 
bias would then be manifested in the signs and significance of the constant term and its 
interactions.  Results of the mixed logit models are presented in Table 2.6.  In five of the 
six treatments none of the socioeconomic factors seem to impact any bias toward the 
status quo, and the constant term has an insignificant mean coefficient and standard  
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Table 2.6  Mixed Logit Models  















































































































      
Model Statistics      
Log-Likelihood -64.401 -82.308 -74.837 -75.588 -85.390 -100.176 
Number of 
choice sets 
204 185 186 193 180 192 
Likelihood ratio 
index 
0.524 0.325 0.390 0.635 0.557 0.514 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  *,**, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from 
zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  500 Halton draws were used for 
each model.  DCP = Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous 
Choice Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision 
Rule; TCP = Trichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = Trichotomous Choice 
Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 = Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule. 
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deviation.  There is some evidence of status quo bias in the TCV1 treatment as seen by 
the significant negative constant coefficient, which is somewhat mitigated by the positive 
coefficients on the interaction terms with age and male.  However, status quo bias does 
appear to be affected by elicitation mechanism.  Several questions in both formats had 
zero spread with the status quo option, meaning that the respondent would be indifferent 
between the two options if maximizing his earnings.  Examining the frequency of the 
status quo choice leads to interesting findings between the two formats.  In every single 
instance where the subject was indifferent in a DC treatment, the subject chose the status 
quo.  However, those subjects in TC treatments tended to randomize equally when faced 
with such a question.36  Further research is needed to determine how respondents view 
these formats and if different decision heuristics might arise according to the number of 
options presented.    
Finally, incentive compatibility is tested by comparing the experimental choice 
models with constructed choice models predicted by theory where subjects choose to 
maximize their earnings.  Choice experiments can calculate the marginal willingness to 
pay for each attribute if a payment attribute is included in the choice set.  Marginal 
willingness to pay for Red and Blue goods under empirical and theoretical treatments is 
presented in Table 2.7.  Distributions around the median estimates were constructed 
according to the numerical resampling procedure described by Krinsky and Robb (1986).  
To determine if responses are demand revealing, these distributions were compared using 
the complete combinatorial convolution approach of Poe et al (2005).  Table 2.8 presents     
                                                
36 A Fisher exact test cannot reject the hypothesis that the choice between status quo and action options that 
have equal earnings in the TC treatments is purely random (p = 0.445). 
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Table 2.7  Empirical and Theoretical Marginal WTP ($) 
 Experimental Theory 
 Red Blue Red Blue 
     
DCP 2.50 
(0.588  4.945) 
2.10 
(0.839  3.747) 
2.35 
(1.651  3.620) 
2.06 
(1.574  3.197) 
     
DCV1 2.85 
(1.008  10.643) 
2.92 
(1.453  10.434) 
2.13 
(1.449  3.510) 
2.13 
(1.544  3.791) 
     
DCV2 3.44 




(1.905  5.131) 
2.35 
(1.689  4.379) 
     
TCP 1.81 
(-0.854  5.968) 
1.98 
(-0.312  4.808) 
2.44 
(2.046  3.962) 
2.02 
(1.316  4.041) 
     
TCV1 3.53 
(2.507  8.073) 
1.81 
(1.229  3.464) 
2.38 
(1.977  3.756) 
2.02 
(1.601  3.109) 
     
TCV2 2.22 
(1.275  5.091) 
1.93 
(1.097  6.985) 
2.37 
(1.888  3.771) 
2.04 
(1.616  3.128) 
 95% confidence intervals are in parentheses.  DCP = Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision 
Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague 
with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP = Trichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = 
Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision Rule; TCV2 = Trichotomous Choice Vague with 
Regulator Provision Rule. 
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Table 2.8  Comparing Empirical and Theoretical WTP distributions 
Treatment Red Blue 
DCP 0.454 0.489 
DCV1 0.271 0.228 
DCV2 0.372 0.372 
TCP 0.768 0.532 
TCV1 0.664 0.669 
TCV2 0.604 0.555 
Entries in table provide the p-value derived by Poe et al (2005) of the hypothesis that the 
difference between the experimentally and theoretically generated estimates of willingness to pay 
is zero.  DCP = Dichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; DCV1 = Dichotomous Choice 
Vague Provision Rule; DCV2 = Dichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule; TCP 
= Trichotomous Choice Plurality Provision Rule; TCV1 = Trichotomous Choice Vague Provision 
Rule; TCV2 = Trichotomous Choice Vague with Regulator Provision Rule. 
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the test statistic that is comparable to a p-value of the hypothesis that the difference 
between the experimentally and theoretically generated estimates of willingness to pay is 
zero.  As all test statistics cannot be rejected at any significance level, there is no 
evidence of incentive incompatibility.  While some treatments result in a higher rate of 




This study provides a test of the incentive compatibility of choice experiments, 
which represents a promising new method for valuing nonmarket goods.  The success of 
choice experiments as an alternative to contingent valuation depends on its ability to 
yield demand-revealing responses.  Theoretical evidence demonstrates that under certain 
plausible beliefs the trichotomous choice framework can be incentive compatible.  
Specifically, if the survey respondent is relatively uninformed regarding the support each 
option might garner within the population, he will have the incentive to answer truthfully, 
even under the vague provision rules.  Many choice experiment surveys describe 
nonmarket goods that are relatively unfamiliar to respondents, so this belief structure may 
characterize numerous applications.  In order to assess the likelihood of truthful 
responses, researchers must include debriefing questions in a choice experiment survey to 
ascertain previous knowledge of the good in question and the respondents belief 
regarding relative support for the good in the population and the plausibility that the 
relevant agency will provide the good. 
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As opposed to previous tests of the incentive properties of choice experiments, this 
study more closely mimics field applications by including a consequential experimental 
design.  Previous tests have in general compared real responses with a purely  
hypothetical question in which respondents had zero probability of influencing the actual 
provision of the good.  As Carson, Groves, and Machina (2000) have shown, a necessary 
condition for incentive compatibility is that the survey is consequential.  Field 
applications of choice experiments, however, generally include language stating that 
responses will be considered in the policymaking process.  To incorporate 
consequentiality, this study includes vague provision rule treatments in an induced value 
laboratory setting that lead respondents to believe they have input in the provision of the 
public good, although this influence is more uncertain than the referendum provision rule 
found in CV applications.   
The empirical evidence gathered indicates that choice experiments with 
trichotomous options and repeated choice sets can be incentive compatible under 
reasonable assumptions regarding the distribution of preferences over options.  While the 
induced-value design of the experiment in this paper controlled for many potential 
sources of status quo bias such as cost uncertainty, plausibility of implementation and 
other respondent beliefs, differences in the rate of deviations from theory still exist 
among treatments.  An interesting finding is the occurrence of fewer errors in the 
trichotomous choice formats relative to the dichotomous choice formats, and the 
tendency of dichotomous choice subjects to choose the status quo.  Assuming the 
cognitive task involved is simpler in the dichotomous choice context, further research is 
needed to discover why respondents might employ different decision heuristics when 
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answering trichotomous choice versus dichotomous choice questions.  Further research 
will also address situations where the cost of provision is uncertain. 
An important implication of this study is evidence that the choice experiment 
referendum format results in fewer deviations from theory than similarly constructed 
referendum CV responses.  This suggests that CV applications may be improved by 
adopting the attribute-based CE format for two options.  
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Appendix A.  SAS Code 
 
%macro where;  
bad = (x5 & x1 = 2) + (x5 & x1 = 3); 
%mend; 
%mktex(3 3 3 3 3, n=3*3*3*3*3, seed = 238, restrictions = where) 
data final(drop=i); 
set design end=eof; 
retain f1-f2 1 f3 0; 
output; 
if eof then do; 
array x[8] x1-x5 f1-f3; 




%choiceff(data=final, model=class(x1-x5), nsets=18, maxiter=100, 
flags=f1-f3, beta=zero); 
%mktblock(data=best, nalts=3, nblocks=3, factors=x1-x5) 
data key; 
input visibility days gasoline IM Electricity; 
format IM dollar5.0; 
format Electricity dollar5.0; 
datalines; 
1 16 0 0 0  
7 24 4 20 72 
15 32 8 50 144 
;  
%mktlab (data=blocked, key = key); 
Variable Mapping: 






proc print; run; 
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Appendix B.  Example of Knoxville Survey Instrument 
  
Air Quality in the Knoxville Metropolitan Area 
























The University of Tennessee is undertaking a research project to help policymakers better 
understand the value of air quality in the Knoxville metropolitan area.  We would like 
your opinion on the quality of air in this area, and if policies should be undertaken to 
address this issue.  The major goal of this study is to provide accurate information to 
policymakers.  
 
We would be grateful if you would take about 10-15 minutes to complete the attached 
survey that asks you to compare different policy options.  This survey should be 
completed by an adult over eighteen years of age who participates in deciding household 
expenses.  Your address was chosen at random.  Your participation in this survey is 
completely voluntary.  Should you choose to participate in our survey, your answers will 
remain confidential.   
 
If you would like to enter a random drawing for one of ten $50 Wal-Mart gift certificates, 
please fill in the optional form at the end of the survey.  This form will be immediately 
separated from returned, completed questionnaires.  The University of Tennessee will 
release no information as to how any particular survey was answered.  
 
Thank you in advance for taking the time to fill out and return this survey. 
 
If you would like us to send you a copy of the results of the study after it is completed, or 
if you have questions or comments contact: 
 
Jill Collins 
Department of Economics 
College of Business Administration 
505A Stokely Management Center 
University of Tennessee 











Knoxville Metro Area Air Quality Survey, Block 1 
 
SECTION A: General Issues 
 
To start off, we would like to find out what you think about some general issues facing 




Please circle the number on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating the issue is not at 
all important and 5 indicating the issue is very important to you: 
 
     Not important   Very important 
 
Improving education in TN   1 2 3 4 5 
 
Local environmental quality   1 2 3 4 5 
 
Homeland security issues in TN  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Health care in TN    1 2 3 4 5 
 





One of the issues mentioned in Question 1 was Local environmental quality.  
Please circle the number on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating not at all 
important and 5 indicating very important to you: 
 
     Not important   Very important 
 
Reducing water pollution   1 2 3 4 5 
 
Reducing air pollution   1 2 3 4 5 
 
Preventing global warming   1 2 3 4 5 
 
Preserving natural areas   1 2 3 4 5 
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SECTION B:  Air Quality Issues in the Knoxville Metro Area 
 
Ozone and Particulate Matter Emissions  
 
In a report by the American Lung Association titled, State of the Air: 2003, the 
Knoxville metro area (Anderson, Blount, Knox, Loudon, Sevier and Union Counties) was 
listed as having the 9th worst air quality in the nation.  Indeed, since 1999, the Knoxville 
metro area has had, on average, 40 days per year when the air quality was considered 
unhealthy by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  On these unhealthy days, 
the Knoxville area violated the EPA standard for a regulated pollutant.  EPA sets these air 
quality standards to protect human health, using the best available scientific information.  
Violations occur in the Knoxville area because of excess ground-level ozone and 




Unlike ozone in the upper atmosphere that protects against the suns ultraviolet rays, 
ground-level ozone is a pollutant that has negative effects on health. 
 
What is ground-level ozone and what causes it? 
 
• Ground-level ozone is an airborne pollutant that occurs mostly in warmer, 
summer months 
• Caused by a reaction between sunlight and two pollutants: nitrogen oxides and 
hydrocarbons 
• Major sources are: motor vehicle exhaust, coal-fired power plants, industrial 
emissions, gasoline vapors, and chemical solvents 
 
What are the effects of ground-level ozone? 
 
• Wheezing, coughing, breathing difficulties during outdoor activities 
• Aggravated asthma 
• Increased susceptibility to respiratory illnesses such as bronchitis and pneumonia 
• Children, the elderly, and people with respiratory difficulties are most susceptible, 
as well as those who spend a lot of time outdoors 










Particulate matter is the other major source of air quality problems in the Knoxville area.   
 
What is particulate matter and what causes it? 
 
• Particulate matter are suspended particles in the air including road dust, diesel 
soot, wood smoke, fly ash, and sulfate aerosols 
• Major sources are: coal-fired power plants, industrial boilers, diesel and gas-
powered vehicles, and wood stoves 
 
What are the effects of particulate matter? 
 
• Aggravated asthma 
• Coughing and difficult or painful breathing 
• Chronic bronchitis 
• Reduced visibility (haze) 




SECTION C: Policy Options for Improving Air Quality 
 
Over the next few years, air quality will improve because of actions already taken by the 
federal government.  These measures will likely improve local visibility by about one 
mile, and reduce the number of unhealthy days in the area from 40 to 24 unhealthy days 
per year.  However, the Knoxville area is still projected to violate the EPA standards even 
with these national measures in place.  Local air quality officials are currently deciding 
what additional pollution reduction measures are needed to meet the EPA air quality 
standards.  Possible pollution reduction measures include:  
 
• Vehicle inspection and maintenance  
• Different blends of gasoline and diesel fuel 
• Lower speed limits on rural interstates 
• Additional regulations on power plants 
 
We may need to undertake several of these actions to meet the EPA standards.  As a 
result of these measures, your household may realize environmental and health benefits 
but at a cost to your household budget.  The purpose of this survey is to find out what 






Please consider the following benefits and costs associated with implementing one or 




Improvement in Visibility 
 
Currently the annual average visibility in the Great Smoky Mountains is 25 miles.  
Average visibility would be 93 miles under natural conditions with no pollution.  
Visibility is mostly affected by levels of particulate matter.  If additional pollution 
reduction measures are undertaken by the Knoxville area, visibility could improve by up 
to 15 miles. 
 
Improvement in Healthy Air Quality Days 
 
From 1999  2003, the Knoxville metro area averaged approximately 40 unhealthy air 
quality days per year.  Most of the unhealthy days in the Knoxville area have been due to 
ozone pollution.  If the Knoxville area takes additional measures to reduce pollution, the 
number of healthy air quality days could be improved by up to 32 days, which would 




Increase in Gasoline Price  
 
Some pollution reduction measures would require cleaner-burning fuel such as 
reformulated gasoline.  Reformulated gasoline meets the power requirements of all 
gasoline vehicles, but costs more to produce.  Other measures that could affect the price 
of gasoline would be the use of special equipment at gas stations to recover vapor 
emissions.  The possible range of price increases per gallon of gasoline is from zero (no 
actions relating to gasoline are taken) to 8 additional cents per gallon.   For a small car 
averaging 22 miles per gallon and driven 12,000 miles per year, a 4-cent price increase 
would cost about $22 per year, while an 8-cent increase would cost $44 per year.  For a 
large vehicle averaging 12 miles per gallon and driven 12,000 miles per year, a 4-cent 
price increase would cost $40 per year, while an 8-cent increase would cost $80 per year. 
 
 
Vehicle Inspection and Maintenance  
 
A vehicle inspection and maintenance program would test emissions of all registered 
passenger cars and trucks each year.  If a vehicle fails the emissions test, it would need to 
be repaired and re-tested before the owner could renew registration.  The yearly 
inspection fee is $20, and if a car fails, the average repair cost is $145.  Most vehicles do 
not need to be repaired each year.  The range of costs per vehicle for this program is from 
zero (no vehicle inspection program) to $50 per year (average repair costs over the 
104 
lifetime of the vehicle plus the yearly inspection fee). 
 
Increase in Electricity Bill  
 
Power plants emit pollutants that contribute to both ozone and particulate matter 
pollution.  To reduce emissions, power plants may need to purchase control equipment, 
which in turn could lead to increases in the monthly electricity bill for your household.  
Possible increases in a households electricity bill range from zero (no additional controls 




SECTION D: Your Preferred Policy Options 
 
This section will present various combinations of the benefits and costs of achieving air 
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Over the next six questions, you are asked to 
choose the option that you most prefer.  Remember, if a particular policy option is 
implemented, you would be required to pay the amount identified by the cost attributes, 
and will have less to spend on other goods and services.   
 
The No Local Action option refers to the situation where no additional pollution 
reduction measures are taken by the Knoxville area, and the area will remain in violation 
of the EPA standards.  Because the area will be violating EPA standards, the Knoxville 
area may also lose federal highway funds and future business development under the No 
Local Action option. 
 
Please note that the number of healthy days can be improved without improving visibility 
because of the different effects of ozone and particulate matter.   
 
While the following six questions may seem similar, your responses to all questions are 





Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air 
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Please indicate which policy you prefer 
by checking one of the boxes below. 
 
 
Policy Benefits and Costs 
Local Policy A Local Policy B Policy C: 
No Local Action 
Visibility improvement 1 mile 7 miles 1 mile 
Healthy days improvement 32 days 16 days 16 days 
Gasoline price increase per gallon 0 cents 8 cents 0 cents 
Vehicle inspection cost per year $50 $20 $0 
Increase in electric bill per year $144 $72 $0 
 
I would choose: Policy A Policy B Policy C
 
If you choose Policy A, you are indicating that you would prefer the policy with these 
outcomes: 
 
• Visibility improvement: 1 mile.  Under this policy option, average annual 
visibility would improve from 25 miles to 26 miles. 
• Healthy days improvement: 32.  Under this policy option, the number of healthy 
days would improve by 32 days.  Instead of 40 unhealthy days per year, there 
would only be 8 unhealthy days per year on average. 
• Gasoline price increase per gallon: 0 cents.  This policy option does not include 
changes to gasoline, so gasoline prices would be unaffected. 
• Vehicle inspection cost per year: $50.  Emissions testing is a part of this policy 
option. The cost represents the testing fee ($20) plus the average payment if a 
vehicle fails inspection, spread out over a five-year lifetime of the vehicle ($30). 
• Increase in electric bill per year: $144.  This policy option would require power 
plants to install additional equipment, and lead to electricity price increases of $12 
per month, or $144 per year. 
  
Policy B has a similar interpretation, while Policy C represents the No Local Action 
scenario where benefits occur because of actions already taken by the federal 
government.  For this reason Policy C has no new costs to households, but the area may 







Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air 
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Please indicate which policy you prefer 
by checking one of the boxes below. 
 
 
Policy Benefits and Costs 
Local Policy A Local Policy B Policy C:      
No Local Action 
Visibility improvement 7 miles 15 miles 1 mile 
Healthy days improvement 32 days 24 days 16 days 
Gasoline price increase per gallon 0 cents 8 cents 0 cents 
Vehicle inspection cost per year $20 $0 $0 
Increase in electric bill per year $144 $72 $0 
    




Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air 
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Please indicate which policy you prefer 
by checking one of the boxes below. 
 
 
Policy Benefits and Costs 
Local Policy A Local Policy B Policy C:      
No Local Action 
Visibility improvement 1 mile 15 miles 1 mile 
Healthy days improvement  32 days 24 days 16 days 
Gasoline price increase per gallon 4 cents 0 cents 0 cents 
Vehicle inspection cost per year $0 $20 $0 
Increase in electric bill per year $72 $144 $0 
    






Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air 
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Please indicate which policy you prefer 
by checking one of the boxes below. 
 
 
Policy Benefits and Costs 
Local Policy A Local Policy B Policy C:      
No Local Action 
Visibility improvement 15 miles 7 miles 1 mile 
Healthy days improvement 32 days 32 days 16 days 
Gasoline price increase per gallon 4 cents 0 cents 0 cents 
Vehicle inspection cost per year $0 $20 $0 
Increase in electric bill per year $144 $72 $0 
    




Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air 
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Please indicate which policy you prefer 
by checking one of the boxes below. 
 
 
Policy Benefits and Costs 
Local Policy A Local Policy B Policy C:      
No Local Action 
Visibility improvement 15 miles 1 mile 1 mile 
Healthy days improvement 16 days 32 days 16 days 
Gasoline price increase per gallon 8 cents 4 cents 0 cents 
Vehicle inspection cost per year $0 $50 $0 
Increase in electric bill per year $72 $0 $0 
    






Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air 
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Please indicate which policy you prefer 
by checking one of the boxes below. 
 
 
Policy Benefits and Costs 
Local Policy A Local Policy B Policy C:      
No Local Action 
Visibility improvement 15 miles 1 mile 1 mile 
Healthy days improvement 16 days 32 days 16 days 
Gasoline price increase per gallon 0 cents 4 cents 0 cents 
Vehicle inspection cost per year $20 $0 $0 
Increase in electric bill per year $72 $0 $0 
    




Suppose the following three policies were the only options available for achieving air 
quality goals in the Knoxville metro area.  Please indicate which policy you prefer 
by checking one of the boxes below. 
 
 
Policy Benefits and Costs 
Local Policy A Local Policy B Policy C:      
No Local Action 
Visibility improvement 7 miles 1 mile 1 mile 
Healthy days improvement 32 days 32 days 16 days 
Gasoline price increase per gallon 0 cents 4 cents 0 cents 
Vehicle inspection cost per year $50 $20 $0 
Increase in electric bill per year $144 $72 $0 
    




SECTION E:  About You and Your Household 
 
In this section of the questionnaire, we would like to ask you a few questions about 
yourself and your family background to make sure the people we are surveying are 






(a) Have you read any news articles within the past year about Knoxvilles air 
quality? 
 
     Yes  
 
      No 
 
 
(b) If you responded yes, did the news articles give a favorable or unfavorable 
view of air quality in the Knoxville metro area? 
 





(c) In your opinion, were the news articles you read accurate?  








(a) Including yourself, how many people live in your household? ____________ 
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(b) How many of these people (including yourself) are members of your family? 
______ 
 
(c) How many of these people (including yourself) are 16 years of age or older? 
_______ 
 




















What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
Elementary or some High School 
 
High School Graduate/GED 
 
Trade or Vocational Certification 
 








































What is your current marital status? 
 
 Married  Divorced 
 








(a) Because income is often a very good indicator of perspectives on outdoor 
recreation and perspectives on community improvements, we would like to ask you 
a sensitive question.  Please remember your name will not be used in any way 
relating to your responses.  What was your approximate 2003 household income, 
including income from interest and dividend income and/or retirement income 
before taxes? 
 
Less than $10,000 
 
$10,000 to $19,999 
 
$20,000 to $29,999 
 
$30,000 to $39,999 
 
$40,000 to $49,999 
 
$50,000 to $59,999 
 
$60,000 to $69,999 
 
$70,000 to $79,999 
 
$80,000 to $89,999 
 
$90,000 to $99,999 
 
More than $100,000 
 
 




 Yes, unusually high 
 








Please describe your employment status. 
  
Employed full time  Unemployed, between jobs 
  















(a) Does anyone in your household have asthma or other respiratory diseases such 







(b) Do you know someone outside your household in the Knoxville area who has 















Question 22  
 
(a) How many passenger cars does your household own/lease? ____________ 
 
(b) How many sport utility vehicles or trucks does your household own/lease? 
________ 
 
(c) Do you own any vehicles that are at least five years old?        




















(b) If you answered Yes, approximately how many times did you visit last year? 
 
















Which policy benefit do you think is more important?  
 
 Visibility improvement 
 





Please rank the policy payment methods from 1 to 3, with 1 representing the 
method you would most support if placed on a ballot: 
 
 Vehicle inspection and maintenance 
  
 Electricity bill 
 
 Gasoline price 
 
 








All your answers will be kept strictly confidential 
 
Thank you very much for your assistance.  We greatly appreciate your 
effort and time. 
 
Please return your questionnaire in the enclosed envelope to: 
 
Jill Collins 
Department of Economics 
The University of Tennessee 
505A Stokely Management Center 
Knoxville TN 37996 
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Appendix C.  Sample Selection Bias 
 
 
Because of the low response rate to the survey, an analysis of sample selection 
was attempted using a two-stage, Heckman type selection model.  The survey was mailed 
to a random sample of Knoxville area households in the hope that respondents would 
accurately reflect the preferences of the entire population.  If the only differences 
between respondents and the underlying population are based on observed factors such as 
age, gender, education, etc., then the model can provide consistent estimates of 
willingness to pay by simply using the population metrics.  If, on the other hand, 
preferences of survey respondents systematically differ from non-respondents based on 
unobservable factors, estimates of willingness to pay will be biased (Cameron et al, 
1999).   
The bias from sample selection arises from an incidentally truncated sample.  
Suppose that an individual derives utility from completing the survey (net of any costs 
associated with survey completion) and that this utility is determined by a vector of 
observable factors w and a stochastic component, u.  This propensity to respond to the 
survey cannot be observed by the analyst, who can only observe if the survey is 
completed.  Responses are only gathered for individuals whose latent net utility from 
completing the survey is greater than zero.   
Let nnn uwz +′=θ
*  describe the latent utility function of individual n that also 
serves as the model selection equation.  Since nz*  is unobservable, the binary outcome, 
zn, is equal to one if the survey is returned and zero otherwise.  Following Heckman 
117 
(1979), this selection equation can be estimated with a probit model, assuming that un ∼  
N(0,1).  The probability that zn =1 is ( )nwθ ′Φ and the probability that zn =0 is 1- ( )nwθ ′Φ  
where ( )nwθ ′Φ  describes the cumulative density function for a variable with a normal 
distribution evaluated at nwθ ′ .  Let yn represent the primary outcome of interest (i.e., the 
choice of policy option in the current study) that is observed only if zn =1.  Following 
Greene (2005), if nnn xy εβ +′= and un and nε  ∼  bivariate normal [0,0,1, ρσ ε , ], then 
E [ ]1=nzy  = nxβ ′ ( )nn wθλρσ ε ′+  and Var [ ]1=nzy  = ( )]1[ 22 nn wθδρσ ε ′− ] where nλ  










and ( )nnnn wθλλδ ′−= . 
Essentially the bias from ignoring the issue of sample selection results from 
omitting a relevant variable, the inverse mills ratio.  The Heckman two-stage model 
includes the inverse mills ratio constructed from the selection equation as an additional 
variable in the second stage linear regression model to correct for any selection bias.  
However, this model is not readily applicable to a second stage equation with non-normal 
errors such as the mixed logit specification.  Following Hellerstein (2006), instead of 
assuming that un is correlated with the extreme value error of each alternative, this model 
assumes that un and nβ
~  (the stochastic, individual and observation-specific component of 
a random parameter) have a bivariate normal distribution.  A random parameter in the 















where β  is the estimated value of the mean of the random parameter, nβ
~  is the 
estimated standard deviation of the random parameter, ρ  is the estimated correlation 
between un and nβ
~ , nor is a random number drawn from the standard normal distribution 
and nλ  and nδ  are given by the first stage estimation.  While this model can correct for 
correlation among the unobservable factors in the selection equation and in the stochastic 
elements of the random parameters, it constrains the specification of the random 
parameters to normal distributions in order to utilize the bivariate normal distribution.  
Also, in a model with multiple random parameters, the correlations between un and the 
stochastic element of each random parameter are assumed to be independent. 
To estimate the model, socioeconomic characteristics were gathered on the entire 
mailing sample through use of the 2000 U.S. Census at the zip code level.  While the 
ideal would be to have specific data on all recipients at the household level, aggregation 
at the zip code level may still capture some heterogeneity of survey recipients if 
neighborhoods are relatively homogenous.  A total of 63 zip codes were used in the 
model, with respondents distinguished from non-respondents by the completion of the 
Wal-Mart raffle form returned with the completed survey (approximately 291 
respondents, 72% of returned surveys, completed this form).  Non-respondent zip codes 
were known from the original mailing.   
The vector wn includes Census zip code characteristics (see Table A.1) suggested 
by Cameron et al (1999) in their selection model related to a mail survey on water-based 
recreational participation within the Columbia River systems, in addition to a dummy 
variable equal to one if the household resides in Knox County.   
119 
 
Table A.1  Variables Used in Selection Model  
Variable Definition Sample Mean (std. dev.) 
White Proportion white  0.90 (0.12) 
Language isolated Proportion language-isolated 0.01 (0.01) 
Longtime resident 
Proportion long-term resident (at 
least 5 years) 
0.94 (0.01) 
Long commute 
Proportion with long commute (at 
least 20 minutes) 
0.54 (0.11) 
College degree Proportion college-educated 0.22 (0.13) 
Median income Median household income ($000s) 37.59 (10.79) 
Retirement income Proportion with retirement income 0.18 (0.04) 
Knox =1 if household resides in Knox 
County, 0 otherwise 
0.68 (0.47) 
All variables defined according to relevant zip code area. 
 
Hellersteins model was run for the identified 291 respondents, assuming that un 
has a bivariate normal distribution with the stochastic element of the three random 
parameters: the alternative specific constant, visibility and healthy days.  The Gauss-
based program developed by Hellerstein is still in its initial stages of development, and 
consequently only preliminary results are presented here.  The first stage selection 
equation is presented in Table A.2.  Marginal effects are shown for ease of interpretation.  
Only the presence of retirement income and Knox County residence appear to 
significantly affect the probability of returning the survey.  The dominant effect comes 
from retirement income, with each percentage increase in the proportion of residents 
receiving retirement income increasing the likelihood to respond by 49.2%.  Residence in 
Knox County increases the propensity to respond by 3.7%.  However, the model does not 
seem to provide a good fit for the data, with a likelihood ratio index of only 0.008.   
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Table A.2  Selection Model Results  




Language isolated -0.114 
(1.325) 
Longtime resident -0.300 
(0.768) 
Long commute 0.099 
(0.101) 
College degree 0.090 
(0.121) 
Median income -0.000 
(0.001) 





Model Statistics  
Log-Likelihood -864.506 
Likelihood ratio index 0.008 
N 2289 
Dependent variable = 1 if responded to the survey, 0 otherwise.  *,**, and *** denote parameter 
is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  The 
likelihood ratio index provides the percentage increase in the log-likelihood function relative to 
the model estimated with constants only. 
 
Second stage results could not be obtained due to a lack of model convergence.  Further 
testing will be conducted with the ongoing development of the software. 
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This is an experiment about decision making.  Funds for this research have been provided 
by a grant.  Please pay careful attention to the instructions.  By following them carefully, 
you may earn considerable money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the 
experiment.   
 
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the 
experiment. Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions. In order to 
keep your decisions private, please do not reveal your choices to any other participant. 
 
We have some simple yet very important rules: 
 
• Do not communicate with anyone in the room except a coordinator. 
• Please do not hesitate to ask questions. If you have a question, raise your hand and a 
coordinator will answer it. 
 
In this experiment we are giving you a starting balance of $7. Your earnings will 
ultimately depend on two things. First, before we get to the main experiment you will go 
through some examples. You will be paid by correctly performing calculations within the 
context of these examples. Second, your earnings will depend on the choices that you and 
the other participants make in the experiment. 
 




In this experiment you will be presented with six choice questions. For each question you 
will be asked to select among a set of options. Each option specifies an amount of two 
goods that would be provided and the total cost associated with their provision. We have 
labeled the two goods as Red and Blue. You value both Red and Blue goods in the sense 
that they are worth money to you if provided. Others in the experiment value these goods 
as well, although values differ across people.  
 
You have all been given a Value Card that shows your per-unit value of Red and Blue 
goods.  In other words, your Value Card tells you how much money you receive, per unit, 
when these goods are provided.  Know that values differ across people so do not show 
anyone your card.  Using your Value Card, you will be selecting options that you prefer, 
depending on how many units of Red and Blue goods are provided in each option and 







Example choice question 
 
In the experiment you will face choice questions similar to that in the following example. 
 
 
Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 










Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $4 $6 $0 
 
I choose: Option A Option B Option C
 
If you choose Option A, you are indicating that you would prefer the option with these 
outcomes: 
• Number of Red goods provided: 3 units.   
• Number of Blue goods provided: 1 unit.   
• Total cost per person: $4.   
 
If you choose Option B, you are indicating that you would prefer the option with these 
outcomes: 
• Number of Red goods provided: 2 units.   
• Number of Blue goods provided: 3 units.   
• Total cost per person: $6.   
 
If you choose Option C, you are indicating that you would prefer the Status Quo 
option with these outcomes:   
• Number of Red goods provided: 1 unit.   
• Number of Blue goods provided: 1 unit.   
• Total cost per person: $0.   
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Based on your choice and the choices of the other participants, one of the options will be 
implemented for everyone in the experiment.  Your earnings for the implemented option 
will be: 
  
Your per-unit value of the Red good ×  the number of Red goods provided 
+ Your per-unit value of the Blue good × the number of Blue goods provided 
 Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
$ Your earnings  
  
 
Understanding Earnings Calculations 
 
It is very important for our research that you understand how your earnings will be 
determined in the experiment.  We ask that you please answer the three questions below, 
using the following Example Value Card. Please note that this Example Value Card is 
different from the Value Card that you will use in the experiment.  We will pay you $2 if 
you correctly answer all questions. 
 
EXAMPLE VALUE CARD 
 
Your value of Red goods:  $2 per unit 
 
Your value of Blue goods: $2 per unit 
 
For any option that is implemented, you will: 
• Pay the cost of the option 
• Receive your value of $2 for every unit of the Red good provided 
• Receive your value of $2 for every unit of the Blue good provided 




Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Example Value Card and indicate which 




Option A Option B Option C: 
Status Quo 
Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $8 $6 $0 
 
I choose: Option A Option B Option C
 
1. Suppose that Option A is implemented for the group. Using the Example Value Card, 
what will your earnings be if Option A is implemented? 
 
_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
EARNINGS $ ________________ 
 
2. Now suppose that instead Option B is implemented for the group. Using the Example 




_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
 





3. Finally, now suppose that instead Option C is implemented for the group. Using the 
Example Value Card, what will your earnings be if Option C is implemented? 
 
_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
 
EARNINGS $ ________________ 
 
 




Determining which Option is Implemented 
 
Based on the option that you select and the options that others in this experiment select, 
we will implement one and only one of the options for everyone in the group. We will do 
this using poker chips and a bag as follows. For each person that selects Option A we will 
place a white chip in the bag. For each person that selects Option B we will place a black 
chip in the bag. For each person that selects Option C we will place a green chip in the 
bag.  In addition, the experiment coordinators will place a certain number of blue chips in 
the bag. The number of blue chips the coordinators will place in the bag will equal the 
number of people in the group.  We will then have a volunteer pull a chip out of the bag. 
The option that corresponds with the color of poker chip chosen will be implemented.  
The coordinators have written down on a piece of paper the option that corresponds to a 
blue chip.  This will be revealed to you in the event a blue chip is drawn from the bag. 
 
Here is an example.  Suppose there are 20 people in the group.  Three people select 
Option A so we put 3 white chips in the bag.  Seven people choose Option B so we put 7 
black chips in the bag, and the rest choose Option C so we put 10 green chips in the bag.  
Because there are 20 people in the group, the coordinators will put 20 blue chips in the 
bag.  If a white chip is drawn, Option A is implemented, if a black chip is drawn Option 
B is implemented, if a green chip is drawn Option C is implemented, and finally, if a blue 
chip is drawn the coordinators will reveal the option on the piece of paper that will be 
implemented.   
 
Earning money in this experiment 
 
You will be paid for only one of the questions. After all six choice questions have been 
answered, we will ask a volunteer to roll a six-sided die. The number rolled will 
correspond to the question you will be paid for.  
 
For this randomly selected question, we will use the procedure above to determine which 
option is implemented. Your earnings will be calculated by subtracting the cost of the 
selected option from your value of the units provided, plus your starting balance of $7. 
Your value of the units provided will equal your per-unit value of the Red good 
multiplied by the number of Red units provided, plus your per-unit value of the Blue 
good multiplied by the number of Blue units provided.   
 
Please note that you must pay the amount associated with the policy option that is drawn 
from the bag of chips, even if you selected another option while answering the choice 
question.   
 
Just about ready 
 
For all six choice questions there will be a Status Quo option where one unit of Red 
and one unit of Blue are provided at no additional cost to each person. The characteristics 
of the other options will vary from one question to the next. 
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For a particular Question, everyone faces the same options as you do. However, everyone 
will not see the questions in the same order.  Finally, keep in mind that while the 
following six questions may seem similar, your responses to all questions are extremely 




Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 




Option A Option B Option C: 
Status Quo 
Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $4 $2.50 $0 
 















In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space 
below to calculate your earnings. 
 
Option implemented: _________ 
 
Your earnings based on this implemented Option: 
 
_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
 




Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 




Option A Option B Option C: 
Status Quo 
Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $4 $2.50 $0 
 















In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space 
below to calculate your earnings. 
 
Option implemented: _________ 
 
Your earnings based on this implemented Option: 
 
_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
 




Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 




Option A Option B Option C: 
Status Quo 
Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $2.50 $4 $0 
 















In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space 
below to calculate your earnings. 
 
Option implemented: _________ 
 
Your earnings based on this implemented Option: 
 
_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
 




Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 




Option A Option B Option C: 
Status Quo 
Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $2.50 $4 $0 
 















In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space 
below to calculate your earnings. 
 
Option implemented: _________ 
 
Your earnings based on this implemented Option: 
 
_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
 




Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 




Option A Option B Option C: 
Status Quo 
Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $4 $2.50 $0 
 















In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space 
below to calculate your earnings. 
 
Option implemented: _________ 
 
Your earnings based on this implemented Option: 
 
_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
 




Suppose the following three options were the only options available to produce Red 
and Blue goods.  Please examine your Value Card and indicate which option you 




Option A Option B Option C: 
Status Quo 
Number of Red goods provided  







Total cost per person $2.50 $4 $0 
 















In the event that this question is selected to determine your earnings, please use the space 
below to calculate your earnings. 
 
Option implemented: _________ 
 
Your earnings based on this implemented Option: 
 
_______ ×  _______ units of Red goods  
+ _______ × _______ units of Blue goods  
 ________ Total cost per person 
+ Your starting balance of $7 
 
EARNINGS $ ________________ 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please answer the following questions.  This is for our information only and your 
participation is optional.  Your responses will only be associated with your subject 
identification number and will in no way affect your earnings.  
 
1.  What is your age?  ____________ 
 
2.  What is your gender?  (circle one) Male   Female 
 
3.  What is your major?  ______________________________________ 
 
4.  What are you classified as for the current or upcoming semester? (circle one) 
 
 Freshman  Sophomore  Junior   Senior 
Masters Student Law Student  Doctoral Student  
Other ____________   
5. What is your student status for the current semester? (circle one) 
 
Full-time student Part-time student (taking fewer than 12 hours/sem)  
 Not a student   Other (please specify) 
6.  How many economics courses have you taken at the university level? (include this 
term)     _____________________ 
 
7.  Have you previously participated in an economics experiment? (circle one) YES  NO  
 
8. On a scale of 1 (poorly understood) to 5 (well understood), please indicate how 
well you understood the experiment instructions:  
(circle one) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.   Have you ever voted in a state or national election (either in the U.S. or in your home 
country)?   (circle one) YES      NO 
 
10.  In your previous economics classes, have you studied the economics of public 
goods?  (circle one) YES      NO 
 
11.  How would you best describe your current employment situation? (circle one) 
 
Full-time employment outside of the university 
  Part-time employment outside of the university 
  Student only 
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